VARIOUS OPINIONS

OF THE

PHILOSOPHICAL REFORMERS

MAHARAJA SERFOJI'S SARASWATI MAHAL
TANJORE
3206

CONSIDERED;

PARTICULARLY

PAIN'S RIGHTS OF MAN.

BY

CHARLES HAWTREY, M. A.

VICAR OF BAMPTON, OXFORDSHIRE.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR JOHN STOCKDALE, OPPOSITE BURLINGTON HOUSE, PICCADILLY.

1792.

[Price THREE SHILLINGS.]

3206
THE TANJORE MAHARAJA SERFOJI'S SARASWATI MAHAL.

THE CONTENTS.

The act of a nation binding itself for ever, and establishing a particular family with hereditary succession to the government, justified.

Of the right of making war and peace, and in whom vested.

Of abolishing titles.

The law of primogeniture defended.

Of the universal right of conscience, and the abolition of religious establishments.

Of creeds, and particularly of the Athanasian Creed.

Of Tithes.

Of the constitution and origin of the English parliament.

[illegible] 1830

THE RIGHTS OF MAN CONSIDERED.

MODERN philoſophy has evidently its tendency to produce the moſt baneful effects on ſociety. Its object is firſt to annihilate every thing that is ſocial, to diſſolve all thoſe ties and connections which hitherto have linked men together, and which have hindered them from preying upon each other; and out of the chaotic diſſolution to introduce a new ſyſtem and order of things, by which wonders the moſt abſurd and the moſt impoſſible are to be brought to paſs, by which all the wiſdom of mankind, from the beginning of the creation to the preſent day, is to be conſidered as folly, and all the folly which conceit can be the parent of is to be eſtabliſhed in its room. All are to be free; there is to be no ſlavery; and yet in the conſtitution of the world, which the impotent efforts of theſe worthies cannot alter, we ſee it is ordained otherwiſe. All are to be equal,

which at the ſame time we know, except man has a new nature given him, cannot be: but, notwithſtanding the equality, ſtill there is to be power in the world; and, to complete the admirable excellence of the ſyſtem, the power is to be derived from thoſe who are to be the ſubjects of it; that is, who are not in poſſeſſion of the power which is to be derived from them. The author of a publication, entitled, "The Rights of Man," has given us pretty much in detail the opinions of modern philoſophers, and he has given them in a language which is ſufficiently vulgar, virulent, and ſcurrilous. His pamphlet is written, as he informs us, in profeſſed oppoſition to Mr. Burke's Letter, and it operates with juſt as much force againſt that admirable performance as the pecking of a beetle does againſt a rock of adamant. It may ſerve with a variety of other performances of a ſimilar tendency to be hung like trophies hereafter around the tomb of Mr. Burke; emblems of the poverty of the heads, the jejuneneſs of the ſpirits, and the malignity of the hearts of thoſe who wrote them.

With regard to the notice which is taken of Mr. Pain in the following pages, the reader

reader perhaps will think it more than his merit, either as a reaſoner or a writer, has any title to; and ſo probably it would be if a club of men, who call themſelves the Conſtitutional Society, had not attempted to give it a conſequence which intrinſically it hath not. They have recommended it by an advertiſement in the following very ſtrong terms.—" At a meeting of a ſociety for conſtitutional information, held Wedneſday, March 23d, 1791:

Reſolved, That the thanks of this ſociety be given to Mr. THOMAS PAIN for his moſt maſterly book, entitled the RIGHTS of MAN, in which not only the malevolent ſophiſms of hireling ſcribblers are detected and expoſed to merited ridicule, but many of the moſt important and beneficial truths are ſtated in a manner ſo irreſiſtably convincing as to promiſe the acceleration of that not very far diſtant period when uſurping borough-ſellers, and profligate borough-buyers, ſhall be deprived of what they impudently chooſe to call their property—the choice of the repreſentatives of the people.—The Conſtitutional Society cannot help expreſſing their ſatisfaction that ſo valuable a publication has proceeded

from a member of that ſociety. And they ſincerely hope that the people of England will give that attention to the ſubjects diſcuſſed in Mr. Pain's treatiſe, which their manifeſt importance ſo juſtly deſerves.

Reſolved, That the foregoing reſolution, and all future proceedings of this ſociety, be regularly tranſmitted by the ſecretary to all our correſponding conſtitutional ſocieties in England, Scotland, and France.

DANIEL ADAMS, Secretary."

Theſe terms of recommendation are undoubtedly very ſtrong, and are defective only in that they are not likewiſe very juſt. But juſt they moſt aſſuredly are not, as will ſoon be ſeen when we have pointed out how miſerably deficient this moſt maſterly performance is in its reaſoning, and how miſerably miſtaken this ſelf-conſtituted ſociety is in its judgment. At the very firſt outſet of his work Mr. Pain ſtumbles. In anſwer to Dr. Price, Mr. Burke had moſt truly ſaid, that by *the principles of the revolution*, the people of England had not acquired a right of chooſing their own governors, of caſhiering them for miſconduct, and of framing a government

for

for themſelves; and in order to prove this, he had referred to the acts of parliament of thoſe days, whereby any ſuch right is abſolutely diſclaimed; any objection, therefore, to this anſwer of Mr. Burke's ought to have gone to the proof, that either the acts of parliament were falſely referred to, or that they were not truly interpreted. But inſtead of this, away goes Mr. Pain, in a kind of whirlwind, to prove what made no part of Mr. Burke's argument. " That there never did, there never will, there never can, exiſt a parliament, or any deſcription of men, or any generation of men, in any country, poſſeſſed of the right or the power of binding and controlling poſterity to the end of time." What hath all this to do with the queſtion in diſpute, which, on Dr. Price's part, was that by *the principles of the revolution* the people of England had acquired; and on Mr. Burke's, that by *the principles of the revolution* they had not acquired the rights ſpecified by Dr. Price? Does Mr. Pain, or do his abettors, the Conſtitutional Society, acknowledge the truth of Dr. Price's poſition? Could any right be acquired to the people of the preſent day by the tranſactions of a parliament an hundred

years ſince. If a right could be acquired for us, a right could be renounced for us; and if it could not be renounced, neither could it be acquired. But Dr. Price ſays a right was acquired, and he lays claim to it in the name of the people of England; therefore Dr. Price acknowledges the very thing which Mr. Pain ſo furiouſly oppoſes, when he ſays, page 117, the parliament or people of 1688 had no right to bind or controul the people of the preſent *day in any ſhape whatever.*

But let us conſider this matter a little; let us conſider whether the acts of preceding times can operate ſo as to influence poſterity; and for this purpoſe, we are to inquire what is the poſterity of a nation, and at what inſtant it firſt begins to be reckoned. If by poſterity are meant the perſons who are born into the world after the framing of the acts, there is a poſterity begun inſtantly as ſoon as the acts are framed; for many then die, and many then are born. If poſterity is then ſaid to be reckoned, when all the perſons concerned in framing the acts, and all who were alive at the time they were framed, are dead, then we ſhall have a double kind of poſterity: a poſterity operated upon, and a

poſterity

posterity exempt from, the operation of the legislative acts; a posterity operated upon, because they happened to come into the world before the entire decease of the legislature; and a posterity not operated upon, because it happened not to exist till after its entire decease. Now if the former may be bound by the acts of the legislature, and this they certainly may, and it is a fact that they certainly are, in like manner may the latter: the one being as much and as truly a posterity as the other. Therefore the acts of the legislature may bind posterity, and in fact no acts of the legislature can or do operate at all without either in a greater or less degree binding posterity. The Constitutional Society deceive themselves, and wish to deceive others, when they patronize and circulate the unfounded and illiberal nonsense of Mr. Pain; for nonsense it most assuredly is to consider laws as binding only for the present moment. Both he and they too come to the consideration of this great political question with the narrow contracted minds of persons who cannot extend their ideas beyond A and B. They either forget or have no comprehension of what a nation is, and there-

fore they argue as if, like an individual, it was ſubject to deceaſe. But a nation is not ſubject to deceaſe by the flow and change of its individuals any more than a river is by the flow and change of its waters: *ille labitur et labetur in omne volubilis ævum*; and notwithſtanding the continued flow of its ſtream, ſtill remaineth to be the ſame river; and ſo alſo doth the nation which, by its continuity, in ſtrict propriety, can have no poſterity. A poſterior time of the nation there may be, and there neceſſarily is; but a poſterior nation, while the nation continues to be, the ſame is a manifeſt abſurdity.

"When a man ceaſes to be (ſaith the author of the pamphlet), his power and his wants ceaſe with him; and having no longer any participation in the concerns of this world, he has no longer any authority in directing who ſhall be its governors, or how its government ſhall be organized, or how adminiſtered." And again, p. 13, "What rule or principle can be laid down that two non-entities, the one out of exiſtence, and the other not in, and who never can meet in this world, that the one ſhould controul the other to the end of time?"—Here evidently

this good man is thinking of the two individuals, John and Thomas, the one dead before the other was born, and consequently incapable of acting upon him. What miserable work is this! What hath this to do with the English nation? Hath the English nation at any period between the present time and the revolution ceased to be, or become a nonentity? It was the English nation which made the law, and consented to and approved of it, for the purpose of binding the English nation, that is, itself to the end of time, or till it should cease to be; but the English nation continueth to be, and to exist as it existed at the revolution; and therefore the laws made at that period for binding the English nation to the end of time, are as binding now as they were then, and will continue to be as binding till the nation itself becomes a nonentity. At the revolution the nation saw itself arrived at that long wished-for period, when the structure of its constitution, which had been the venerable work of ages, had obtained its completion. Here therefore it took up its rest, and resolving its perpetuity, it bound itself to support and maintain the admirable structure to the

end

end of Time. This was not, according to the idle dream of Thomas Pain, the act of a nonentity binding a nonentity; but the act of a great characteristic body binding itself through all the successions of times to which by necessity it would be subjected. And if the act of an individual binding himself to maintain a structure during the term of his natural existence is valid, valid likewise must be the act of a great nation binding itself for the term of its national existence; and as its national existence hath not as yet ceased, but still continues, therefore, in defiance of Thomas Pain and his abettors, the Constitutional Society, every man who is not an idiot will acknowledge, that the laws made for the permanent establishment and preservation of the constitution are as truly, as rightfully, and as perpetually binding upon us now, and henceforward for ever, as they were at the first moment of their being framed.

It is the grand error of Mr. Pain, and it runs through almost the whole of his performance, that he confounds the idea of a national with that of an individual existence. The individual John, after he is dead, certainly

tainly cannot do any thing to bind Thomas, who is not as yet born into the world; and if the nation died as the individual John does, neither could the nation do any thing to bind a future nation which ſhould ariſe after its deceaſe. But if the nation died which conſented to and approved of the national acknowledgment at the revolution, when and what was the moment of its deceaſe? Will the Conſtitutional Society be pleaſed to point out to us this moment? For till they do, Mr. Pain's publication, and their approbation of it, are all in vain.

Carrying on the ſame blunder into his thoughts, concerning an hereditary ſucceſſion to government, p. 134, Mr. Pain ſays, there are two diſtinct heads, under which an hereditary ſucceſſion to the government of a nation may be conſidered. The firſt is, "The right of a particular family to eſtabliſh itſelf;" the ſecond, "The right of a nation to eſtabliſh a particular family." The firſt of theſe he reprobates as deſpotiſm; and of the ſecond he thus expreſſes himſelf:— "But the ſecond head, that of a nation eſtabliſhing a particular family *with hereditary powers*, does not preſent itſelf as deſpotiſm

on

on the firſt reflection. But if men will permit a ſecond reflection to take place, and carry that reflection forward but one remove out of their own perſons to that of their offſpring, they will then ſee that hereditary ſucceſſion becomes in its conſequences the ſame deſpotiſm to others which they reprobated for themſelves." Here we ſee again he wanders from the national to the individual character. On a firſt reflection he acknowledges the right of a nation in eſtabliſhing a particular family with hereditary rights not to be deſpotiſm; but in his ſecond reflection, whereby he would make it to be deſpotiſm, he bids adieu to the nation, and introduces John and Thomas again, with their offspring. But the queſtion relates to the nation, and not to individuals: the queſtion is, whether it is deſpotiſm to the nation? If it is, it is deſpotiſm in the firſt inſtance, which he acknowledges it is not, and therefore it cannot be in his ſecond inſtance, becauſe a nation cannot be the offspring of itſelf. America may be the offspring of the Engliſh nation (and a very undutiful one it has proved), but the Engliſh nation cannot be its own offspring; therefore Mr. Pain argues

with

with inexcusable absurdity. Instead of the words "But if men will permit a second reflection," he should have said, "But if *the nation* will permit a second reflection to take place, and carry that reflection forward but one remove out of itself to that of its offspring, it would then see that hereditary succession becomes in its consequences the same despotism to its offspring which it reprobated for itself." But had he written thus it would not have applied in any respect; and his second reflection, instead of proving what he aims at, would only have proved the insufficiency and fallacy of his own argument.

The right of a nation to establish for itself a particular family with hereditary powers, the man acknowledges; therefore, so long as *itself* continues to have an existence, that particular family is established; and this likewise he ought to acknowledge, if he would argue truly. But truth of argument, through some defect or other, he seems to be a stranger to. The nation, which is the aggregate of generations in continuity, he supposes to be simply a particular generation; and therefore, when he ought to use the word nation,

nation, he fubftitutes in the room of it generation; and applying to the former what belongs only to the latter, he leads the reader through all the changes of wills, teftaments, and I know not what befides.

A generation, we all know, is fubject to deceafe, and to be fucceeded; and the fucceeding generation of a man may be operated upon by the will or teftament of the preceding: but what hath this to do with the nation, whofe character is that it is the aggregate of generations, and which cannot lofe that character, until all the generations which are of its effence ceafe to be? The national character or exiftence doth not defcend, as by a will or bequeft, to a fucceeding generation, but it remains and continues, without any defcent, through all the various flow of generations. It was the Englifh nation an hundred years ago, and it will be the Englifh nation an hundred years hence, if the flow of generations continues; and therefore, to argue, as this writer doth, from the right of a particular generation to the right of a nation, is ridiculoufly foolifh and abfurd in the extreme.

Page 137, he fays, " In whatever light

hereditary ſucceſſion, as growing out of the will and teſtament of ſome former generation, preſents itſelf, it is an abſurdity. A cannot make a will to take from B the property of B and give it to C. Yet this is the manner in which (what is called) hereditary ſucceſſion by law operates." But hereditary ſucceſſion does not grow out of the will or teſtament of ſome former generation, or out of the will of any generation at all: it is the fixt, permanent eſtabliſhment of the nation for itſelf during its own exiſtence, and for the term of its own exiſtence. If hereditary ſucceſſion proceeds from a will or teſtament, by neceſſity the death of the teſtator muſt have taken place before it could have its effect; for a moſt aſſured truth it is, that no teſtament is of force while the teſtator liveth. Now in this caſe, who was the teſtator? Mr. Pain ſays it was a former generation, and yet we all know, in the eſtabliſhment of an hereditary ſucceſſion, no teſtator at all was concerned; it was a national act in its national character; and the former generation, by which Mr. Pain deceives himſelf, was nothing more than the organ, the inſtrument whereby this national act was ef-

fected; and whether that generation lived or died, was of no manner of consequence, because the establishment of the hereditary succession at the revolution was not the act of any particular generation, but of the nation in its characteristic and national capacity. The English nation is the universal body of the people of England in all its generations and existence; and an act of the English nation binding itself for ever is an act binding it through all its generations and existence, and the manifestation of this act must be either by the personal appearance and acknowledgment of the universal body of the people, a case which I believe never yet has happened, or the manifestation of it must be by the people's proper and constitutional representatives. Thus it was at the revolution. The act relative to the settlement of the crown, and hereditary succession to it, in the Protestant line was established by the proper and constitutional representatives of the people: the nation acquiesced in that establishment, and thereby made it its own act as much as if the universal body of the people had personally consented to and approved of it.

If it ſhould be ſaid that by this acquieſcence the nation made it its own act for that time, but not beyond it, it will be neceſſary that the objector ſhould ſpecify for what time; whether for an hour, a day, or for years, and for what number of years, and when he has or can do this, it will be time enough to give an anſwer to the objection: however, to ſatisfy us that there is no deception in the tendency of the preceding arguments, let us attend to what follows.

A nation is the univerſal body of people in the flow of its generations; and the ſucceeding generations are as much of the eſſence of the nation as the preceding: for at no two inſtants of time does the nation conſiſt of the ſame ſpecific generations. By births and deaths they vary every inſtant. Therefore every national act, if it operates at all, doth, by neceſſity in its operations, extend beyond that particular generation to which thoſe appertained who were the organs or inſtruments of giving the national ſanction to ſuch act; and if it doth operate beyond that generation, when is it to ſtop? where is the line beyond which its operation is not to extend? and who is to draw this line, if the nation itſelf hath not drawn it?

In acts to be in force for a definite time, for 21 years we will say, the nation itself draws the line. In acts for an indefinite time, no line is drawn; such acts may cease or continue, as the nation shall think proper; but in acts made to be perpetual, such acts only then cease to be of force when the nation itself ceases to have existence; in which last instance there neither is any injustice, nor any improper exertion of power, any more than there is in the first instance. In both instances the acts reach into more generations than one, and there is no other difference between them, than what consists in the greater or less number of generations affected by them. In an act of the nation, binding for one and twenty years, there is the same injustice (if indeed there is any injustice in the case) as in one that binds for an hundred years, or for ever. In both cases men are bound who were not in existence when the act was made: therefore in both cases there is equal justice, and as any individual man, whose body we are told never remaineth the same for four and twenty hours together, may bind himself for the term of his natural life, so likewise may the nation, which by the

the flow and change of its generations never consisteth for any two instants of the same individuals, bind itself for the term of its national existence; and against this there is nothing to be opposed but the madness of modern philosophers, and the folly, and perhaps worse of modern clubs.

Mr. Pain, in his declamation against hereditary rights and hereditary succession, is pleased to tell us, that he heard the then Earl of Shelburne in the House of Lords speak words to the following purport: "*That the form of a government was a matter wholly at the will of a nation at all times; that if it chose a monarchial form, it had a right to have it so; and if it afterwards chose to be a republic, it had a right to be a republic, and to say to a king, We have no longer any occasion for you.*" Here then words are put into the mouth of this noble Peer, which most assuredly never could have been spoken by him. We may all of us have heard his Lordship extolled for his wisdom, for his honesty, and lack of duplicity, and for his being destitute of that pride which is too nearly allied to meanness not to be most contemptible; but who ever esteemed his Lordship to be a fool, an idiot, a driveller? and there-

fore ſuch a ſpeech as this never could have proceeded from the Earl of Shelburne, whom we all know not to be a fool: we will therefore take it for granted that it is the ſportive product only of Mr. Thomas Pain's own invention, and as ſuch we will conſider it.

That men have a right, when deſtitute of any government, to chooſe for themſelves what form they will eſtabliſh and live under, I apprehend none will diſpute. Therefore, if a body of men at any time find themſelves in a country, no matter how all independent of each other, without any rule or controul over them, as they are by the laws of God and nature bound to eſtabliſh ſome form of government for the conduct of themſelves, ſo likewiſe are they at liberty to chooſe what that form ſhall be. Here then we will ſay, in exerciſe of this right, they determine upon a monarchy which they eſtabliſh with an hereditary ſucceſſion. Now in this caſe the right having been exerciſed by a choice being made, the right in future becomes ſuſpended, and in fact extinguiſhed; for ſo long as the effect of their choice continues to be what they choſe it to be, that is a monarchical form of government with hereditary

tary

tary ſucceſſion, there remains no longer any choice to be made, and of courſe the right to chooſe becomes extinguiſhed until the government they choſe becomes extinct: when that happens, indeed their right revives again, but until it does happen, to talk of the people's right to chooſe under what form of government they will live, when the choice is already made and exiſts in all its energy, is no better than the idle reverie of an idiot in a dream.

But it is ſaid, "The form of government is a matter wholly at the will of a nation at all times." It is falſe; and for this reaſon,—the choice is made, the will of the nation is already declared that it will be under a monarchy with an hereditary ſucceſſion. The nation, therefore, is no longer as it was before, without any government and free to chooſe, but under a government, and conſequently reſtrained in its choice by a voluntary act of its own. So that, inſtead of the form of government's being wholly at the will of a nation at all times when the choice is made, the form of government muſt be abided by, and never after is ſubject to the will of the nation.

MAHARAJA SERFOJI'S S.M.

It is ſaid, that if a nation which had choſen a monarchical form of government "afterwards choſe to be a republic, it had a right to be a republic, and to ſay to a king, we have no longer any occaſion for you;" the meaning of which idle ſtuff is, that as a nation has a right to eſtabliſh a form of government when it has none, ſo it has a right to deſtroy a form of government when it has one. Here then let us conſider what is the meaning of the words, "having a right." Man, as a free agent, has a right to act in every thing according to his own will, where there is no law againſt him, and therefore, when he is without a form of government, he has a right to chooſe under what form he will live, becauſe there is no law reſtraining him in his choice, or obliging him to ſet up any one particular form preferably to another. When he acts, therefore, in this matter, and makes his choice, his right aſſuredly is moſt indiſputable. So, in like manner, if he has a right to deſtroy an eſtabliſhed form of government, he muſt have this right, becauſe there is no law againſt him, reſtraining him from doing it; and in ſuch a caſe his right will be equally indiſputable as in the other. But it happens,

moſt

moſt unfortunately for this right, all laws, divine and human, every where and at all times, are and have been againſt this right. It is a contradiction marked with the ſtrongeſt and moſt flagrant degree of abſurdity to ſay that a nation, after it hath eſtabliſhed a government, hath a right to deſtroy it; for government in all its ideas implies obedience from thoſe who are ſubjected to it: and if a nation hath choſen to ſubject itſelf to any particular government, it muſt by neceſſity be under the reſtraint and controul of that government; and, under its controul, it cannot act in any thing relative to it, but according to its eſtabliſhed laws, and therefore it cannot have a right to deſtroy it. When a nation hath made its choice, it moſt aſſuredly hath not its choice to make; and if it hath made choice of a monarchical form of government with hereditary ſucceſſion, it hath no right, and never can have right, to ſay to a king, We have no longer any occaſion for you, and we will be a republic.

But for a moment let us ſuppoſe that the nation had the right which the preſent Marquis of Lanſdown is ſaid to have affirmed it had, and let us diſplay a little the beauties

and prettineſſes of this right. The nation having a right to chooſe (as is before expreſſed) under what form of government it will live, makes choice of a monarchy, and after having for a little time experienced its effects begins to grow tired of it. The government ſhall not be a monarchy any longer, it ſhall be a republic, and ſo they ſend the king about his buſineſs as a perſon for whom they have no farther occaſion, and eſtabliſh a republic; by and by they become diſguſted with a republic, and determine upon having an ariſtocracy. Soon after the ariſtocracy does not pleaſe, and then they will have ſomething elſe; and ſo on through all the various changes that are poſſible in government. What a noble and illuſtrious idea does this give us of human wiſdom, and with what pomp and majeſty muſt a nation of men riſe before our eyes in all the ſplendor of changing and changing, and changing again! You may laugh, if you pleaſe, at the little wayward child which falls a crying becauſe it cannot pleaſe itſelf in the different arrangements of its toys; but infinitely more ridiculous would be ſuch a nation of men; and it ſeems to be almoſt impoſſible that the

wiſe

wiſe Marquis of Lanſdown ſhould have uttered ſuch a ſpeech as Mr. Pain has aſcribed to him, ſo totally unbecoming the dignity of an Engliſh peer, and fit only to have been ſpoken by one eſcaped from an hoſpital of lunatics.

A nation or body of men, if without a form of government, may chooſe for itſelf what form it will eſtabliſh; when that form is eſtabliſhed, it is eſtabliſhed to be the national government in a country: that is, to be the form by which the people inhabiting that particular country are to be governed. But if the government is eſtabliſhed, and the people ſubjected to it, whence comes the idea, and how is it to be ſupported, that the government may be deſtroyed and changed at the will of the people? What a farrago of contradictions is there in this! The people have willed the eſtabliſhment of a national government, and conſequently that it ſhall not be deſtroyed, and yet by their will, which they have already diſpoſed of by willing the contrary, it may be deſtroyed. They have willed their own ſubjection to it (and in ſubjection there can be no power over that to which a thing is ſubjected), yet ſtrange beyond all

poſſibility

poſſibility of comprehenſion, they have a power over that over which they have no power: they have a power of deſtroying and changing that government to whoſe power they have willed their own ſubjection. Is there any thing in Bedlam equal to the madneſs and folly of this? Yet ſuch is the ſtuff adopted and circulated by the revolution and conſtitutional clubs, and their darling Thomas Pain, and his abettors; and ſuch is the madneſs and folly of ſaying, "That the form of government is wholly at the will of a nation *at all times*," juſt as if government was a pack of cards in the hands of a child building houſes with them, and pulling them down again. If we are men, let us act like men and not like children; and if we are reaſonable creatures, let us hearken to the voice of reaſon, and treat with the contempt it deſerves, that philoſophy which hath deranged ſo many in their intellects, and hath taught them to diſcover form and figure in what is nothing but a ſhapeleſs maſs of jumbled confuſion. But it is time that we ſhould proceed to conſider ſome other of thoſe principles which this moſt deſpicable philoſophy is endeavouring to eſtabliſh.

We will begin with the right of making peace and war. "The right of making war and peace, they ſay, is in the nation; for where elſe ſhould it reſide but in thoſe who are to pay the expence?" Here then theſe men conſider the ſubject with the ſpirit of a man who is going to the ſhambles to buy a joint of meat. Is the expence the whole and only ſubject to be attended to in making war and peace? Or does paying towards the expence qualify a man to judge of the propriety of making them? Some people will think juſt the contrary: for in common life we know many a man refuſes to do what is right, and what he ought to do, for the ſake of ſaving the expence, and thus entails upon himſelf coſts and difficulties which otherwiſe he might have avoided. They who are to pay the expence are, generally ſpeaking, the moſt improper perſons that can be to judge in this caſe; they always have a bias upon their minds. The reaſon, the fitneſs, the neceſſity of a war, are matters which they never at all attend to: they are abſorbed only in the conſideration of the expence, which being a preſent evil they will avoid it, if they can, in defiance of all the probable evil conſe-

quences

quences which may arise from it afterwards.

War, with its attendant evils, is undoubtedly a most severe scourge, and were it to cease for ever, through the world, it were an event most devoutly to be wished. But the question is, in the present constitution of human nature, is it an event to be expected so long as lust and ambition, and evil passions, continue to rage within the bosoms of mankind? While men lust and desire to have, will they not endeavour to have? And will not wars and fightings be the necessary consequence of this endeavour? If they will, and surely no man will say they will not, the plausible pretence of our philosophers will be all at an end, when they say that placing the right of making war with those who are to pay the expence will be a means of banishing war for ever from off the face of the earth. Banish, if you can, men's evil lusts and passions, and we will say something to you; but while they remain, and continue to operate, it is not transferring the right of making war to those who are to pay the expence of it, that will cause wars to cease in all the world. But to the question.

If

If cauſe for war ariſes, and cauſe for it certainly will ariſe, ſo long as human nature continues to be what it is at preſent, with whom ſhould the right be placed of determining whether it ought to be entered upon or not; that is, to judge whether the cauſe is ſufficient to juſtify a declaration of war?—Should it be placed with thoſe who by neceſſity are partial, intereſted, and prejudiced? or with thoſe who having no particular intereſt in the caſe, nor bias upon their minds, will moſt probably judge according to the ſoundeſt and beſt dictates of human wiſdom, and without partiality? No man can heſitate in his anſwer to this, and therefore we will ſay the right of declaring war ought not to be with thoſe whoſe minds are biaſſed by ſelf-intereſt and partiality. They who are to pay the expence of a war are neceſſarily biaſſed by the ſelf-intereſt which that expence occaſions, therefore they will endeavour to proportion the juſtneſs of the cauſe for war to the meaſure of that ſelf-intereſt, and conſequently will either decide againſt it entirely, or elſe having their attention almoſt wholly engroſſed by the expence, will cauſe it to be carried on with a ſpiritleſs penury, and of courſe without

without effect. It ought not therefore undoubtedly to be left to them who are to pay the expence of it, to decide upon the expediency of a declaration of war. To whom then ought it to be left? In every country, be the form of government what it will, the right of deciding on the expediency of a declaration of war ought to be with those in whose hands is the power of government; for government being, in its very essence, formed for the properest regulation and protection of the society over which it is constituted, hath no particular interests of its own to gratify, nor any but what are bound up in the interests of that society. Therefore, if the expence of a war will evidently prove more than a nation can support, it is not to be imagined that it will do otherwise than desist from it.

Government is to be considered as the medium between a nation and its enemies, either for the purpose of protection or mutual reconciliation. In protection it will use the means, and all the means, when necessary, with which the nation can supply it. The greatness of the expence, if it is not ruinously great, will be no hinderance or check

to it in carrying it on. It has none of the little bias of private or ſelf intereſt to divert it in its progreſs, and therefore will proceed ſteadily, with its eye fixed only upon the juſtice of the cauſe, and the end to be obtained. If the end can be obtained without war, government will then act as the medium of reconciliation between the nation and its enemy; and, inattentive to popular prejudices, or the tumult of faction, will effect, by the milder means of negotiation and treaty, what the fury of enraged minds would require ſhould be exacted at the point only of the ſword.

But it will be ſaid, if the right of making war or peace reſides in the government of a country, where that government is an arbitrary deſpotic monarchy, matters will by no means be conducted as here repreſented. In ſuch a caſe, the will of the monarch will be the ſole criterion of the expediency of a declaration of war; regard will be had neither to the juſtice of the cauſe for which the war is declared, nor to the magnitude of the expence attending it, but ſolely to the monarch's private ambition, which is to be gratified by it. Here then we muſt enter into a diſcuſſion

which, probably will not be agreeable to all palates. The reader, however, will be pleaſed to conſider it merely as an allegation of facts, without entering at all into their merits either the one way or the other, or the inferences which may be drawn from them.

A deſpotic monarchy is ſaid to be that where the will of one perſon only arbitrarily controls and diſpoſes of millions of people at his own pleaſure. But where either is, or hath been, ſuch a monarchy ever found upon the earth, which *in fact* hath, or doth, diſpoſe of the people at its own pleaſure? In deſpotic countries, is not the very deſpotiſm founded in the laws of thoſe countries? could it ſubſiſt without them? could any deſpot, by any individual power of his own, eſtabliſh himſelf over millions of people, or compel them to bend to his yoke without their own conſent? Where then is the deſpot that ever could diſpoſe of millions of people at *his own* pleaſure? he is no where to be found, and never exiſted any where but in the confuſed brains of wild theoriſts. The deſpot ſucceeds to his crown, and with the conſent of the people, as truly and certainly as in an elective monarchy; and if he ſucceeds to it with

more

more power, and leſs reſtraint upon him, than the elected monarch does, ſtill how can he alone, at his own pleaſure, exerciſe this greater power, except he is ſeconded and ſupported in it? Therefore his actions, be they what they may, proceed as much from the will and pleaſure of thoſe who ſupport him, as from himſelf. Nominally, indeed, and for form ſake, they are ſaid to proceed ſolely from him; but his mind muſt have been framed in a very uncommon mould, who doth not know that the will of a deſpot, unſupported by his ſubjects, is no more than the will of a non-entity. By overloading the character of a deſpot with blood and cruelty, the character becomes ſuch as neither doth or ever did exiſt *in rerum natura*. A deſpot certainly hath more power than other monarchs; but when he comes to exert that power, he muſt exert it as other monarchs do, with the ſtrength of others; for if he attempts to exert it without that aſſiſtant ſtrength, he neceſſarily falls a victim to the attempt. In deſpotic monarchies, the attempt, it muſt be acknowledged, hath been repeatedly made; but of what conſiſts the hiſtory of ſuch? It is the hiſtory of monarchs dethroned and murdered; for never

any despot, in his unjustifiable endeavours to stretch himself beyond his own line, ever succeeded in them, nor ever tyrannized over his subjects by the arbitrary exertion of his own solitary power, but it ended in his ruin. Much, very much more than is true, have we heard of the arbitrary power of kings. Kings are now held up to us as objects of the utmost abhorrence; as monsters, against whom every effort of mankind was to be exerted, in order to keep them fast bound in chains and fetters. But what tyranny of any king was ever equal to that of a tyrannical republic? The tyrannical and personal cruelty of a king can never reach beyond the extent of a very small circle, and that must necessarily be of but a very short duration; but the tyranny of the people has no limits to its extent, and baffles every effort to withstand it; and were a wise man to choose whether he would live under the tyranny of an arbitrary monarch or under the tyranny of a republic, he could not hesitate a moment in his choice. Against the evil effects of the former he might guard himself, but against the latter he would be without remedy, and the most guarded prudence would be in vain. Men are strangely

apt to exclaim againſt the tyranny of kings, without ſuffering themſelves to reflect wherein that tyranny conſiſts. A king is but a ſingle ſolitary individual man, and, generally ſpeaking, with no more ſtrength than is the common lot of other men: how then can he, alone, act the tyrant? If he acts the tyrant, it muſt be with the ſtrength of others; but then the tyranny is in a much greater degree theirs, than it is his; and if he is nominally a tyrant, it is becauſe he is at the head of a band of tyrants; for, in fact, a deſpotic tyranny is neither more nor leſs than a combination of the more numerous and more powerful part of the people, with a king at the head of them, againſt the fewer and weaker part, wherein the king is the oſtenſible tyrant; but the tyranny is effected by the other. Had a king a power and might of his own, independent, ſelf-ſupported, requiring no other aid than that of his own arm, ſuch an one indeed might juſtly become an object of dread and terror to us; for having a power all but divine, and a heart entirely human, the very worſt of evils might be apprehended from him; and then indeed the tyranny would be

all his own. But as the world is conſtituted, it is very much the reverſe.

The glory of a king is the glory of his people, and the ambition of a king, in its gratification, is the ambition of his people. Was the ambition of Louis XIV. merely his individual ambition? If it had been ſuch, it never had been gratified. It was the ambition of the French people, who gratified their king for the purpoſe of gratifying themſelves: his glory (ſuch as it was) was theirs alſo, and they were as proud of their Grand Monarque as he poſſibly could be of their adulation, and as ſenſible of any diſgrace which befel him as he himſelf could be. So that the outcry againſt kings as tyrants, is ridiculous. A king cannot be a tyrant without the people's becoming the voluntary executioners of his tyranny; neither can his ambition be of any kind of conſequence, nor have any effect, except the people participate with him in it. Tarquin, we will own, was properly and perſonally a tyrant, but he was no otherwiſe ſo than any private man may be, and he paid dearly for it. Tyranny of government in a king muſt be where the laws and the people

have

have made the king a tyrant; for otherwiſe, whatever may be his inclination, he cannot, it is not in his power, to be one. How could our Henry VIII. have been the tyrant he was, if the laws as they then were, and the people, had not ſupported him in his tyranny? Are the Turkiſh emperors tyrants by neceſſity, becauſe they are emperors? By no means: they are tyrants becauſe the conſtitution of their country has made them ſo; for emperors, aſſuredly, might be without tyranny. They, therefore, that talk of the pride, the ambition, the tyranny of kings, talk entirely at random. The pride and the ambition of kings is as perſonal in them as it is in any other individuals, and extends no farther, except where the laws and the community have given an extent to them; and in that caſe, the pride and ambition of kings become the pride and ambition of the community. Hence, when it is objected, that in deſpotic monarchies the right of making war and peace ought not to reſide in the deſpot, becauſe it will be made ſubſervient to his pride and ambition; men reaſon fallaciouſly, and deceive themſelves by confounding the pride and ambition of an unconnected individual

vidual with that of the public character of a king, with which a whole community is connected. When a king wishes to extend his territories, and effects it, it may be we allow a gratification of his personal pride, that he is the lord of a greater extent of territory. But is this all? Are not his territories so much the more respectable by being extended, and do not his subjects share with him in a gratification of their pride also? They share with him in his pride, as they would also in his disgrace, were any unfortunate event to deprive him of a part of his dominions. The pride and ambition therefore of the despot, in his public character, is inseparable from the pride and ambition of his subjects. When Alexander overran the world, he was instigated to it, we will say, by his own private ambition; but then he was enabled to effect it by the equal and concurring ambition of the Macedonians, and by that alone; for when their ambition was sufficiently gratified, he was obliged to set bounds to his own, and to proceed no farther; which plainly shews that the pride and ambition of kings hath no farther effect than as it is supported by the concurring pride and ambition of the subject.

ſubject. The pride and ambition therefore of deſpotic princes is no reaſon why the right of declaring war ſhould not reſide in them.

Let not the language of deſpotic princes be urged againſt any thing that has been here ſaid. The terms, "I command, It is my will," and the like, are terms put into their mouths by the laws of the country over which they preſide, and of courſe are only common forms, and of no greater conſequence than if they were to ſay, "I wiſh, It is my deſire;" for a compliance with his wiſh or deſire is as truly and certainly obedience to the monarch as a compliance with his will and command. If it be ſaid, the deſpot uſes other arrogant and aſſuming language, which cannot have its origin in the laws; let it be granted that he ſometimes does, what will follow? Nothing but that his folly is ſuperior to his arrogance. The language of deſpots is too often miſinterpreted, and inferences are drawn from it which it will by no means juſtify. When Nero (I think it was) ſaid, he wiſhed the Roman people had all one neck, that he might execute his vengeance upon them at a ſingle ſtroke, he was ex-

claimed against on account of the barbarous and inhuman cruelty of the wish; but whatever cruelty there might be in the wish, there was a much greater degree of folly and madness in it; for could he have effected it, what would have become of the emperor? When Nebuchadnezzar, in all the pride of his heart, said, "Is not this great Babylon that I have built for the house of the kingdom, by the might of my power, and for the honour of my majesty?" what was there in all this but the proud speech of a foolish man boasting of what he could not justify to be true, and the honour of whose majesty was presently after consigned by his subjects to take up its residence with the beasts of the field.

The pride and arrogance of any individual man is rarely if ever derived from his particular station in life. The pride is in his heart, and will be there in the most inferior as well as the most exalted state, without any other difference in the expression of it than what arises from the difference of that state. A man that is a king will express his pride in the style and language of royalty, because that is his state and condition; and the same man, had he been in an inferior

condition,

condition, would have expressed the same pride of his heart in a style accommodated to that inferior condition. Pride is not by necessity inseparable from kingly power, because kings have been and may be humble: and they who are not so when they are kings, never would have been so had they not been kings: therefore, all the obloquy and abuse vented against regal power, on account of the pride and ambition which has and may be displayed by men that are kings, proceeds merely from ignorance and stupidity, for the pride is in the man; and if it was not in the man, it never would be in the king. But since we are upon the subject, let us suppose that the whole race of kings was exterminated, and that the very name was blotted out from all remembrance under heaven, what would be the consequence? The business of government must still be carried on; and as it must not be carried on by one man, it must be carried on by more than one man. Here then, instead of having to contend with the pride and ambition of one individual, we shall have to contend with the pride and ambition of perhaps a whole pandemonium; for, except you can

prove

prove that a democracy is by neceſſity deſtructive of all pride and ambition in the human heart, we ſhall have pride to contend with under a democratic as certainly as under a government by kings, and a pride that is infinitely more pernicious and perſevering; for who is there that will not acknowledge it to be much more eaſy to perſuade and prevail upon a ſingle individual than upon many? The mind of the individual, having no other reſources but what it finds within itſelf, may be overpowered, and yield to the voice of reaſon; and thus the ſwelling of a proud and ambitious heart may be entirely ſuppreſſed; but in a democracy it is totally otherwiſe. Like the waves of a diſturbed ocean, the ſuppreſſion of one wave only ſerves to make room for the elevation of another: when one voice is ſilenced another becomes exalted; and when reaſon and truth have operated to the conviction of one mind, others are all loſt in the tumultuous babble of confuſion. The abolition, therefore, of the regal power would gain nothing to us as a recompence, but an accumulation of hopeleſs evils.

The evils that would ariſe to us from the

abolition

abolition of kings, may be moſt ſtrongly exemplified in the buſineſs of making war and peace: for as in this inſtance many minds muſt neceſſarily be conſulted, and abſolute unanimity is not to be expected: when they ought to be acting they would be debating; and when they ſhould be offending or defending themſelves againſt the approaches of the enemy, they would be arguing one with another whether they ought to do either, and thus perhaps bring upon themſelves and their country irreparable miſchief or ruin. An enemy could not wiſh a greater advantage over a people than to have their oppoſition to him depend upon their democratical reſolves. He would always be certain of finding or prevailing upon ſome among them to be a friend to himſelf. Their reſolves would always be known to him long before they could have an opportunity of putting them in execution; and thus he would be enabled to defeat all their beſt projected ſchemes, and to render them altogether ineffectual: whereas under the government of a wiſe king (and every king is wiſe who governs himſelf by the wiſdom of experienced and faithful counſellors) every thing would be conducted with

ſecreſy

ſecreſy and diſpatch; nor would the enemy be able to diſcover, otherwiſe than by conjecture, any thing that was projected, until the moment of execution.

Upon this principle it is that, under the Engliſh conſtitution, the right of declaring war is veſted in the crown. It is not veſted there for the purpoſe of aggrandizing the crown, or of depreſſing the people, or of rendering them inconſequential; but for the better and more effectual preſervation of the people in their perſons and properties, which would be greatly hazarded, perhaps entirely loſt, if the buſineſs of the war was firſt to be ſubmitted to the debates and harangues of declamatory demagogues. But let us ſuppoſe for a moment that the right was not in the crown, and that no war was to be declared until the miniſter had ſubmitted the whole of the buſineſs to the determination of thoſe who were to pay the expence; the procedure then upon the occaſion would moſt probably be in the following manner.

Firſt, the miniſter muſt ſtate preciſely in all its parts what the facts were which called for a declaration of war. The facts being ſtated, debate of courſe would enſue, wherein

in it would be enquired whether, ſuppoſing the facts to be as they were ſtated, they were ſufficient to juſtify a declaration of war; and if it was admitted that they were, then the queſtion would be as to the authenticity of the facts; and if the authenticity of any them ſhould depend, as moſt probably it would, upon ſecret though certain intelligence, the authors of it muſt be given up, and an unreſerved diſplay made of every circumſtance belonging to it. Now what man is there ſo loſt in his judgment as not to perceive the ruinous conſequences that muſt neceſſarily attend ſuch a procedure as this? But it might happen that the miniſter, from a principle of honour, would refuſe to deliver up to public notoriety the perſons from whom he received his intelligence. In that caſe, all the ſtorm of public fury would fall upon himſelf, and he would be vilified and traduced as an impoſtor, who under falſe pretences wanted to levy taxes on the people, in order to anſwer ſome private purpoſes of his own, a war would be reprobated, no proviſion would be made for either defence or offence, and thus the enemy would have every advantage given him that he could poſſibly deſire, and

the country probably would be desolated, because the people chose to act, as the people almost always do act in such cases, that is, like fools and madmen.

They, therefore, who so loudly exclaim under the English constitution, that all measures antecedent and preparatory to a war ought to be explicitly submitted to the people who are to pay the expence, either are strangers to the true interests of their country, or wish not to promote them. A minister in England is responsible for his conduct; and when he involves his country in a ruinous and destructive war, without sufficient grounds to justify him in his conduct, by the acknowledgment of all parties, he is punishable. It is therefore at his own extreme peril if he enters upon an unjustifiable war; and therefore the people have all the security that self-interest can give them that he will not do it.

With the most consummate wisdom then, it is provided by the English constitution that the right of declaring war and peace should always and irrevocably reside in the crown. The people cannot be injured by this, for the persons employed by the crown are responsible for their conduct: but they would be

most

most extremely injured if it were otherwise; for, under the tardiness and fluctuation of their resolves, the moment would be gone which might have ensured to them success. The public notoriety of their proceedings would defeat all the intentions of them, and proclaim, as with the sound of a trumpet, to the enemy what ought to have been most secret, and what he ought not to have known, till the instant of execution.

No one surely will say, in opposition to this, that if the right now resident in the crown was in the people, none of the evils mentioned would happen, for they would select a committee of two or three, or perhaps a dozen persons, with whom the whole business should be entrusted, which might be conducted with the same secresy and success as it possibly could be under the crown. No one, I think, will urge this; for though it might be true, still what does it tend to prove? Not that the right ought to be in the people, but the contrary, that the right ought not to reside in the people, because if it did, they are incompetent to the exercise of it; they must surrender it to be exercised by others, to prevent the ruinous conse-

quences that would be derived from its being exercifed by themfelves. But as this is the cafe, why object to the right being refident in the crown, when at the fame time if it was to refide in the people, the people could not exercife it? Is not this the fqualling of a little perverfe brat, that wants to have in its own hand a weight which it hath not ftrength to hold? The moft prominent feature in this philofophical age is childifhnefs. It meets us in a variety of other inftances befides that which has been now confidered, and moft glaringly in the abolition of titles, and the equalizing principle. Let us beftow a few thoughts upon this moft ridiculous fubject.

All men are equal, therefore there fhall be no titles. But will all men be equal becaufe there are no Dukes, Marquifes, Vifcounts, &c.? What do thefe philofophical things, for men they are hardly to be called, mean by the word equal? If they mean by it that all men are equally human creatures, it is true; the beggar hath a human exiftence equally with the grandee, and therefore in that refpect, phyfically confidered, the beggar is equal to the man of the higheft rank

or

or order, or even to a king that ſitteth upon his throne, conſequently titles of rank or order are no infringements of the *natural* equality of mankind; therefore the abolition of them cannot be in order to reſtore the natural equality of the human exiſtence, which equality is juſt the ſame with or without titles; for what end then are they aboliſhed? or what is the inequality which will be deſtroyed by their abolition? A duke, if he has no money, and is obliged to live by the ſolicitation of alms, has no ſuperiority over any common beggar, who without a title does the ſame. What is Lady Betty in Scotland, if a chambermaid, the better for being a ladyſhip; or in what is his lordſhip, who holds your ſtirrup at an inn, ſuperior to any common hoſtler? The title is not the cauſe that there is inequality among men, for a title, without a competent eſtate to ſupport it, *vilior algâ eſt*; but the inequality that there is, and neceſſarily muſt be, amongſt men, is the cauſe and parent of the title; and if there had not been that prior and neceſſary inequality, no man ever would have had a title to diſtinguiſh him from any other perſon.

In the human ſpecies there is no equality, other than what we may call the equality of the ſpecies; in every other reſpect almoſt inequality pervades the whole. Men they are all equally and truly, but in their ſtrength, their powers of exertion, their bodily organs, their quickneſs or ſlowneſs of perception, their perſonal appearance, and the like, the moſt accurate obſerver is unable to produce any two men who are not *unequal* to each other, and who do not differ as the ſuperior differs from the inferior; and differ they do, and will, notwithſtanding every poſſible exertion for effecting the contrary. Throw, if it be poſſible, all the property of the world into one common ſtorehouſe, and let it be equally the property and for the uſe of every man in it, what will you have effected thereby? Not that equality which leaves no traces of ſuperior or inferior, for one man will ſtill be taller and more bulky than another, and conſequently will require more to clothe him. One man will be more robuſt in his conſtitution than another, and of courſe will require more food for his ſuſtenance. One man has greater ſtrength, and

therefore will have greater individual power, as being able to effect by that ſtrength what the weaker is altogether unequal to; therefore the language of philoſophy, when it talks of the equality of men by nature, is in direct oppoſition to what is known to be truth and fact: for by nature men are unequal, and the intent of ſociety is to compenſate for this natural inequality, and to ſupply a remedy for the inconveniences and irregularities which otherwiſe might have proceeded from it. Hence in ſociety power is given where nature had denied ſtrength; and the vigour of an overbearing ſtrength is curbed by the energies of ſubordination. It is one of the moſt pleaſing beauties of ſociety, that in it even the weakeſt of the human ſpecies is often exalted to bear rule over the mighty, and thereby is freed from that natural inſignificance by which otherwiſe it would be trodden into the earth. If by nature one man univerſally through the ſpecies was as big, and as tall, and as ſtrong as another, if every one had the ſame property and appurtenance as his neighbour, and if in ſociety this deſign and appointment of nature was all counteracted, wiſely would it be contended

that we ought to return to the appointment of nature, and enjoy that equality which nature intended for us. But here the caſe is ſo entirely the reverſe, that if we return to the appointment of nature, we return to a ſtate of abſolute inequality, wherein the ſtrongeſt will be without controul, and the weakeſt will be ſunk and loſt in the powerleſs inefficacy of his nature. Is it not then moſt unaccountably ſtrange that men capable of diſcerning and diſtinguiſhing between truth and falſehood ſhould act ſyſtematically upon ſo very falſe an aſſumption as that all men are by nature equal, when the fact is altogether the reverſe, when the fact is, that by nature men are not equal, and when of the truth of this fact every hour of the day almoſt brings with it even ocular demonſtration? Is it not equally and as ridiculouſly ſtrange that men of a common underſtanding ſhould conſider the diſtinction of titles as a breach upon the equality of men's nature, and ſhould therefore aboliſh them, as they have done in France? How does the taking away the title from a man of fortune make him more upon a level with you, or elevate you into an equality with him? If he hath greater poſſeſſions

than

than you have, will he not be juſt as much your ſuperior, as the proportion of his poſſeſſions is greater, whether you entitle him a duke, or call him only plain George or Thomas; if he hath greater poſſeſſions than you have, he will be able to do more than you can, and of courſe will be your ſuperior, becauſe you cannot do ſo much as he can. He can have more for his own uſe. He can give more to others. He can live in greater ſplendor than you can, and therefore, whether he has a title or not, will have greater reſpect ſhewn to him. Go into any little country place, inhabited only by villagers, and you may ſee it every day exemplified: the headman of the place is he that hath the greateſt wealth, and though he may be the greateſt boor of the little community, ſtill he will have a deference paid to him which the others have not. The deference here is not paid to title but to the wealth and ſubſtance of the man; and ſo it is, and ever will be, through life in all the various combination of its circumſtances. He that hath to give will be always ſuperior to him that hath not.

But it will be ſaid a title gives its poſſeſſor

rank and precedence, totally unconnected with his wealth and ſubſtance, wherein deference is paid merely to the title, and to nothing elſe. Be it ſo; where is the harm, where is the evil of this which calls for an abolition of titles? Where many aſſemble together ſome one muſt be firſt, ſome one muſt have the precedence; and whether this precedence is given to a perſon, with or without a title, does not ſeem to be of any particular conſequence when it is morally conſidered; but when conſidered with a view to the order and regularity of our civil intercourſe with each other, it hath a meaning, and a very good one in it, becauſe it ſettles before-hand what otherwiſe might be the parent of endleſs altercations; no diſputes being ſo furious and tumultuous as thoſe which have for their object the right of precedence. Philoſophers, indeed, tell us that precedence ought to be given only to the man of ſuperior wiſdom and virtue; but they forget, at the ſame time, that there will be ſome difficulty in ſettling to whom this character belongs. In what balance ſhall the wiſdom and virtue of various men be weighed, in order to determine which of them has the ſuperiority? And

without

without bringing them to the balance, how will you be able to aſcertain the ſuperior wiſdom and virtue of any man? Settle this matter among yourſelves firſt, before you object to the precedence which has, from conſtant and uninterrupted uſage, been given to the man of title. If you think any man ſuperior to yourſelf, voluntarily give him place, let him precede you, but do not break in upon the inſtitutions of ſociety which have ordained that a duke ſhall precede you both. Upon the whole then, and that we may not draw this matter out into any unneceſſary length, ſuffice it to ſay, that the abolition of titles proceeds from the wantonneſs of a childiſh caprice, that it never can effect that equality, which is its object, that when the title is aboliſhed there ſtill will remain ſomething which will operate as effectually, and in the ſame manner, as the title, and cauſe one man without wiſdom or virtue to be more taken notice of and diſtinguiſhed than another who has both; and therefore, that the abolition of titles is a moſt fooliſh buſineſs, ſerving only to mark the idleneſs of that philoſophy which is the parent of it.

How far the aboliſhing the rights of pri-

mogeniture may be conſidered in the ſame light, as the foregoing, let us now inquire. To a random, ſuperficial, mind there appears to be ſomething extremely unjuſt in the rights of primogeniture, whereby, "in a family of ſix children, five are expoſed," that is, are not provided for in the ſame manner as the eldeſt. Thus if there is a title in the family the eldeſt ſucceeds to it, of courſe to the excluſion, while he lives, of the other branches. If there is an eſtate in the family, under certain circumſtances, the firſt-born is heir to it. With regard to the firſt of theſe it ſhould ſeem there cannot be any thing of hardſhip in it; the title with which the parent was diſtinguiſhed cannot deſcend to more than one of his children, and therefore if it deſcends at all to either of them, it aſſuredly ought to deſcend to him who hath the priority by the order of his birth; and therefore in this there is nothing to be complained of but what would more ſtrongly apply if the title were to deſcend to either of the other children. However, as the French philoſophers have aboliſhed titles, we need not dwell much upon this ſubject; where there are no titles to deſcend, it is of no conſequence

ſequence to whom they ought to deſcend, therefore let us proceed to conſider the pro-priety of the eſtate deſcending, and being limited to the firſt-born. The eſtate conſiſts, we will ſay, of a manſion-houſe and land. When the parent dies, the manſion becomes the ſole property of the eldeſt; and if he left ſix children, the other five are moſt inhu-manly turned out of doors to find ſhelter for themſelves where they can. Who is there will vindicate ſuch proceeding as this? what law is there, either in reaſon or juſtice, by which five children out of ſix ought to be thrown off as outcaſts merely for the ſake of eſtabliſhing only one who, perhaps, hath not a ſingle virtue to recommend him? Nothing but that he happened to come into the world before the others.

In anſwer to this, as they who thus object are perſons who only ſkim over the ſurface of things, it will be neceſſary that we ſhould be particularly minute. The manſion we will ſuppoſe to be, as the common run of ſuch houſes is, capable of accommodating, conveniently, the parents, children, and do-meſtics, with a few ſpare rooms for the uſe of ſtrangers. Here then, evidently, the man-

ſion-

ſion-houſe is applied to the uſe and accommodation of one ſingle family, and anſwers its purpoſe well. If at the deceaſe of the parent it deſcends to the eldeſt ſon, it will again anſwer the ſame purpoſe. But let us ſuppoſe that it doth not deſcend to the eldeſt ſon, but becomes the equal property of all the ſix children. What will be the conſequence then? The eldeſt ſon marries, and, like his father, becomes the parent of ſix children; and as there is no reaſon why the other five ſhould not marry likewiſe, they alſo become the parents of ſix children each. Here then the houſe, which was never built or intended for more than the uſe of a ſingle family, becomes the property of ſix families, and, in proceſs of time, becomes the property of thirty-ſix families. Need any thing farther be ſaid to demonſtrate the extreme abſurdity of this? The houſe, my learned Thebans, deſcends to one, becauſe it is incapable of containing all; and it deſcends to the eldeſt for the ſame reaſon that the title does. Were the ſix children incapable of, or interdicted from, marriage, or from becoming parents, the manſion might continue to be a reſidence for them all, as it was before the father's

ther's deceaſe; and in that caſe the law would be both unneceſſary and fooliſh which ſhould determine the property of the houſe to be the eldeſt ſon's. But when the fact is ſo much otherwiſe, that not an inſtance can be produced wherein the incapability here referred to ever has happened, the law could not be otherwiſe than it is when it gives the property of the houſe to the eldeſt ſon, to the excluſion of the other five.

But with regard to the land, the caſe is otherwiſe. We will ſay the parent of the ſix children has an eſtate which netts him a thouſand a year; at his deceaſe we will ſuppoſe that it is equally to be divided among them, the ſhare of each will be 166*l.* 13*s.* 4*d.* With this little annual pittance, each marries and becomes the parent of ſix children (and he may as well become the parent of more, as of leſs, than ſix); the portion of each child will in this caſe be leſs than 30*l.* and in the next generation, will be reduced to be next to nothing; it will not be 5*l.* a year for each. So that by this philoſophical diſtribution of a paternal eſtate, the world will be peopled with little elſe than a generation of paupers. What is here ſaid, the reader muſt not conſi-

der

der as ſpoken at random; on a ſmaller ſcale it has been exemplified in a village, known to the writer of theſe pages, which forty or fifty years back was always ſpoken of with the word rich added to it, on account of the wealth and ſubſtance of its principal inhabitants, but now is become as inconſequential as any other poor village, and all owing to the ſplitting and parcelling out the paternal eſtate in the manner above ſuppoſed, by which means they all have ſomething, but none have enough; they all pride themſelves in having eſtates, but their eſtates are ſo trifling that they will not maintain them, or do more than barely pay them for their trouble in looking after them. Now then let us compare this mode of diſtributing a paternal eſtate with the mode that has been approved of, and purſued, by mankind for ages. The eſtate deſcends to the eldeſt, it is charged with the payments of certain ſums to the younger branches, and theſe ſums being paid, the eſtate remains whole and entire to the heir, who, with it, provides in like manner for his heir and family, and ſo on from generation to generation; ſo that, in this manner, as the eſtate is never broken up, it becomes beneficial, through a

long

long ſucceſſion of ages; the younger branches have each a ſum according to the magnitude of the eſtate, which, while it does not equal them in point of property to the eldeſt, ſtill places them above poverty, and enables them to purſue ſome line of buſineſs or profeſſion, which may turn out both profitable and honourable to themſelves. Thus we ſee among ourſelves, the younger branches of our nobility, ſome purſuing the mercantile line, ſome the military profeſſion, ſome that of the law, others doing credit to their country as ſea-officers, and others as eccleſiaſtics. Now, had the paternal eſtates of theſe perſons been ſplit and parcelled out by the philoſophical rule, they would all have thought themſelves mighty men, they would have purſued no line of buſineſs or profeſſion, and in the courſe of a very few years would have left their families without any other inheritance but that of poverty and beggary. Surely the wiſdom of ſo many ages, ſanctioned by the univerſal practice of mankind, muſt be ſuperior to the contemptible and wretched twang of modern philoſophers, who have not ſenſe enough to diſcern that what will ſuffice for one will not be ſufficient for ſix; and who,

under

MAHARAJA SERFOJI'S SARASWATHI MAHAL

under a pretence of providing for the happiness of mankind by their equalizing principle, would diſtribute nothing but pride, ſloth, and beggary, univerſally throughout the world.

But here the philoſopher urgeth why, or for what reaſon, ſhould the elder be preferred before the younger, as by the law of primogeniture, when, perhaps, in wiſdom and virtue the younger is infinitely ſuperior to the elder. The reaſon is in nature, the eldeſt is the firſt; immediately upon his birth he becomes the heir of his father, he becomes ſuch when there are no others who can be competitors with him; and the younger branches, when they come into the world (if ſuch expreſſion is allowable), find the heirſhip preoccupied. The younger branches are not rejected; for not being born they were incapable of being rejected, unleſs, which is impoſſible, you can reject a thing which is not. But they came into the world under the natural diſadvantage and incapacity of the inheritance, becauſe the inheritance was engaged prior to their reſpective births. Now what hardſhip is there in this, what that is not juſtified by all the laws of nature,

nature, and reaſon that men have at any time been made acquainted with? Can it be any hardſhip that a man has not what, by a natural impoſſibility, he was debarred from having? Let us put a caſe. A man has iſſue one ſon, who by law is his heir; within two or three months after his birth the father dies, leaving a wife, unknown to himſelf, pregnant: in due courſe of time ſhe is delivered of another ſon, but for him no proviſion of any kind is made; he is not only precluded from the inheritance, but from any other portion of his father's property. Now who complains of any injuſtice in this caſe? The ſecond ſon was neither in being, nor in proſpect, during his father's life time, and therefore no proviſion was made for him. But is not the caſe very nearly the ſame with regard to the inheritance? The younger children, although in poſſibility, yet were not in being when the elder, by his birth, became the heir of his father, and therefore were by nature incapable of the inheritance, juſt as the other was incapable of having a proviſion made for him. The queſtion is a fooliſh one. Why is the elder preferred before the younger? There is no preference in the caſe, nor can be, except

the elder and the younger were both to come into being at the ſame inſtant, which is impoſſible. The elder has the inheritance by the neceſſity of his birth, and not by any preference of choice; for where one only is the object there can be no choice: and in this caſe one only was concerned, and the inheritance became his, becauſe there was no other; whoſe it could be, and if others came afterwards, they came too late; their claim would be inadmiſſible, as their claim would be for a property which had already found its rightful owner.

It may not, perhaps, by ſome be thought fair to charge men with principles which they do not openly avow; but this abolition of the law of primogeniture ſeems to be but too plainly an attack upon, as it moſt aſſuredly is, in defiance of, the doctrines of revelation. Mr. Burke has been exclaimed againſt becauſe he has ſuggeſted that the ſacrilegious conduct of the French towards their clergy and church was preparatory to their general rejection of Chriſtianity. But if that really was the object they had in view; in the abolition of the law of primogeniture, they ſeem to have contemplated a general adieu to all

all revelation whatſoever. Let us hear Dr. Prieſtley, whoſe evidence cannot be partial in this inſtance, and he will tell us that the philoſophers on the continent were all actually atheiſts, and of courſe he ſufficiently juſtifies Mr. Burke in his ſuggeſtion. He tells us that the greater part of his philoſophical acquaintance ridicule his belief of Chriſtianity: when he was at Paris, after a ſerious converſation on the ſubject of religion, he was told by one of the company that he was the only perſon they had ever met with, of whoſe underſtanding they had any opinion, who pretended to believe Chriſtianity; and as, he on all occaſions, avowed his belief of Chriſtianity; a ſincere Catholic prieſt embraced him with tears, literally running down his cheeks, and told him "that all who were called philoſophers, that he had met with before, were atheiſts." Now, if Dr. Prieſtley ſpeaks truth here, and in a caſe of this nature it is not conceivable that he would ſpeak otherwiſe than what is truth, we may trace the philoſophical principles of the preſent age up to their true and genuine ſource, which is atheiſm; and then, however we may be ſhocked at it, we need not won-

der that perſons of a philoſophical complexion renounce Chriſtianity, and ſcorn to pay any regard to the ordinances of a Deity.

Nothing can be more decidedly determined, by the doctrines of revelation, than the right of primogeniture; it is evident, through all the Scriptures, even from the firſt beginning of the iſſue of man; and when at any time the younger is preferred before the elder, it is always repreſented as a matter not of right but of puniſhment; and when the elder is doomed to ſerve the younger, it is a condemnation of him, a depriving him of that right which nature had given him, on account of his having criminally departed from, and violated, ſome law of the God of nature. The right of primogeniture is as old as the firſt-born of the firſt of the human race. He had, by his birth, a right to rule, a right to the pre-eminence, and to be accepted before his brother; but he did not well, therefore he forfeited his right, and God accepted his brother, when he had no reſpect unto, and rejected him. They, therefore, who aboliſh the law of primogeniture, aboliſh, as far as human impotence can extend, one of the firſt and moſt antient laws of the God of nature. With ſcorn and infamy

to

to itſelf, philoſophy has dared to makĕ bare its arm againſt the God of the univerſe, and to annul thoſe laws which were ſtamped by him in the very firſt nature of man. What then muſt we think of thoſe clubs, what of the principles of thoſe men who unite with, and wiſh ſucceſs to, the promoters of ſuch deteſtable impiety? If they have renounced Chriſtianity, why are they either afraid or aſhamed to publiſh it to the world? If with philoſophy they have embraced atheiſm, why do they not pull off the maſk, and openly avow themſelves to have adopted an atheiſtical ſyſtem? Let them come forward like men, and plainly tell us what theyr eally are, that we may as plainly know what to think or ſay of them. At preſent, their character is ſo extremely unfixed and equivocal, that we know not what to call them. Chriſtians we dare not ſay they are, and atheiſts they have not openly profeſſed themſelves. If they would, without any lurking ſubterfuge or evaſion, point out to us the ground whereon they chooſe to ſet their foot, we would moſt cheerfully meet them, and, if unable to vanquiſh them, we would ſubmit to be for ever the objects of their ſcorn and reproach.

It is remarkable, that in this philoſophical attack upon religion and the Deity, the attack is not made *eo nomine*, or directly, but covertly, and from behind what we may call a political rampart. They would reform the political deviations of mankind; they would remove every thing that was unjuſt or unequal in the government of the world. Kings ſhould not trample upon the natural rights of man, and the people ſhould aſſert their own importance. Liberty, free and unreſtrained, ſhould be diſtributed throughout the world, becauſe, doubtleſs, they underſtand how the ordinances of the world ſhould be diſtributed better than its Maker; of which St. *Domingo* affords a pretty remarkable inſtance; and the univerſal exerciſe of the rights of conſcience ſhould take place of all religious eſtabliſhments. Theſe, with ſome other reforms of a ſimilar nature, are what they affect; and as if they were matters of merely political conſequence, and nothing elſe. But he muſt be blind indeed who doth not perceive how much deeper they ſtrike. The ſtate of nature, which they dwell ſo much upon, and from whence they would derive the rights of man, how poſſibly can we admit it, conſiſtently with the

the account which Mofes has given us of the origin and appointment of the human race? The one or the other we muft reject. The people are the fource and origin of power; but this, befides its palpable abfurdity and nonfenfe, is in direct oppofition to the revelation which tells us, that God is the fource of all power; and this when we put them in mind of, we have no other anfwer to it but that we are advocates for the right divine of kings to govern wrong. No, we are advocates for no fuch nonfenfe: we are the advocates of humility and truth; we afpire not to be like the Moft High, or to affume that power to ourfelves as underived, which ftreams down to us only from the throne of God. If they deny the derivation of power from God, why do they not prove the truth of their own derivation of it from the people? They cannot prove its truth, becaufe it is nonfenfe. The people are the fubjects of the power, and therefore cannot be the origin of it. This however has been fufficiently fhewn in the "Free Thoughts on Liberty, &c." and therefore we will not enlarge upon it any farther here. But concerning the univerfal right of confcience, as they are pleafed to

 term

term it, and the abolition of all religious eſtabliſhments, we muſt enter a little more into detail.

Firſt, of the univerſal right of conſcience. This, if it means any thing, we are to ſuppoſe means the right which every man has to think for himſelf in matters of religion.

Now this right every man, as being a free agent, moſt indiſputably has: he may, and actually does, think for himſelf; and all the inquiſitions in the world will not make him think otherwiſe than he does think. The right he has from nature; it is properly his own; and, while he is capable of thinking, it is a right which it is impoſſible to deprive him of. What then are theſe men contending for? They are contending for a right which, it is univerſally acknowledged, every man has, which every man is actually in poſſeſſion of, and which all the powers of the earth combined cannot take away. Either therefore they do not expreſs clearly what they really mean, or we miſapprehend them, or they do not underſtand themſelves. The latter ſeems to be moſt probable, as ſhall be exemplified from Sir Brooke Boothby's Letter to Mr. Burke.

"No

"No man (ſaith Sir Brooke), or body of men, under any pretence whatſoever, can aſſume the power of governing or forcing the belief, the thoughts, the reaſon of others, without the moſt impious and fooliſh arrogance of the power of God." So ſay we alſo, and we ſay a great deal more; that no man now, or body of men, except they were fools or madmen, would attempt any ſuch thing, becauſe we all know that the attempt itſelf is an impoſſibility. By force or violence, men may be made to ſay and do an hundred things which are contrary to their judgment; but to make them think and judge contrary to their thoughts and judgment, is what I believe never was attempted even in Bedlam. The worthy baronet certainly muſt be miſtaken, nor perceive how little the language he here uſes tends towards the point at which he aims.

In like manner Pain, with his uſual declamatory wildneſs, ſays, "The French conſtitution hath aboliſhed *toleration*, and *intoleration* alſo, and hath eſtabliſhed UNIVERSAL RIGHT OF CONSCIENCE." There may be meaning in this, but not being able to fathom its depth, we muſt confeſs we do not

underſtand it. It has been generally underſtood, that conſcience, and the univerſal right of conſcience, is not ſubject to, or determinable by, human conſtitutions, either one way or the other. A human conſtitution can neither eſtabliſh or deſtroy the right of conſcience. It is nature's eſtabliſhment as much and as truly as the ſenſations of pleaſure or pain. How ridiculous would it have ſounded had the French pretended to have eſtabliſhed the univerſal right of men to feel pleaſure or pain, when they were the ſubjects of either! But this would not be more ridiculous than their eſtabliſhment of their univerſal right of conſcience, which every man who is not inſane knows and feels himſelf to be in poſſeſſion of by the gift of nature, and that no human power can either eſtabliſh or take it away from him. So alſo Pain ſays, "The liberty of conſcience which a man claims, is not for the ſervice of himſelf, but of his God." But who denies him this liberty of conſcience, or who can deprive him of it? If he is an atheiſt, can any one hinder him from having the conſcience of an atheiſt? If you are a Chriſtian, will you not have the conſcience of a Chriſtian, in ſpite

of

of all the efforts of all the powers in the world? Liberty of confcience is a term very much in ufe among men, and a great deal of evil has been effected by the ufe of it. But it is moft foolifhly mifapplied; for liberty is a freedom from reftraint where reftraint is poffible, which in the bufinefs of confcience it is not. No man, no earthly power, can reftrain confcience, which will be what it is, whether this pretended liberty be given or withholden. What then is this liberty of confcience? It is a folly, it is a nothing, it is an idle unmeaning mifapplication of one word to another, in order to raife a found which fhall make it feem to be that which it is not. If Mr. Pain had faid, the liberty of acting according to his confcience, which a man claims, is not for the fervice of himfelf, but of his God, it would have had fome meaning, and we fhould have underftood him; but then it would not have anfwered his purpofe, becaufe then the queftion naturally would have occurred, Suppofe the confcience of the claimant fhould be a very bad one, ought he, in fuch cafe, to have the liberty of acting according to it, and of difturbing the peace of the world? Perhaps Mr. Pain may think he

he ought; but it is believed all ſober men will be of a different opinion. Think a man may as he pleaſes, and, if he be an atheiſt, he may enrol his name, if he chooſes it, in any club of that denomination, but if he preſumes to act, in his dealings with mankind, upon the principles of atheiſm, there are very few who will not ſay, it is quite immaterial on what tree he ends his days.

If he had ſaid, the liberty of acting according to his conſcience in the *worſhip of God*, which a man claims, &c. we ſhould alſo have very well underſtood him. But then the queſtion, here in England, would have occurred again, Is any man debarred of this liberty, and who is he? The atheiſt renounces the worſhip of a Deity, and who interrupts even him? The Jew hath his ſynagogue, and the Roman catholic his chapel; the ſectary his tabernacle: what other liberty of acting according to his conſcience in the worſhip of God would he have, or indeed can he have? He worſhips God without reſtraint or interruption, according to his own judgment; and he that doth this, if he hath not the liberty of acting according to his own conſcience in the worſhip of God, he

muſt

muſt tell us wherein his liberty ſuffereth any abridgment, for we know not where to diſcover it.

Moſt certain it is that in England no man's liberty is controuled in the worſhip of God: every man is free to act in this matter as ſeemeth good to him in his own eyes. The civil power interferes only where the civil intereſt is concerned: religious opinions it meddles not with, either to compel their being received or rejected. The civil power indeed preſides over and governs men of all denominations, whom it reſtrains with the ſword of juſtice when they are ſtubborn and evil doers; but it dictates to no man what ſhall be his religious principles: whatever they are, every man is at liberty to enjoy them unmoleſted; and enjoy them unmoleſted he certainly does, if we may give credit to public notoriety. But if we give credit to Sir Brooke Boothby, mankind has groaned for more than a thouſand years under a confederation between civil and eccleſiaſtical power. "By this contract," ſaith he, "for the bodies and ſouls of men, the mind is firſt to be enſlaved, and then the body delivered over to the ſecular arm, with its active principle, the ſpring of all its

virtues

virtues and faculties, bound up in chains. From this complicated tyranny even death itſelf is no refuge. Its power extends into the kingdom of darkneſs: the miſerable mortal who has not obeyed its ordinances here, who does not go to the grave clothed in the *ſan benito* of their inquiſition, and carry in his hand the paſſport of abſolution, is handed over to the agents of the hierarchy in another world, to the diſcipline of eternal torment." If Sir Brooke means all this of England, if he means that men's minds are enſlaved in this country, and that they are handed over to the agents of the hierarchy in another world to the diſcipline of eternal torment, he muſt be a perſon of a moſt wretched information. For his own credit it is to be hoped that he has no ſuch meaning, although by what follows we hardly know how to exculpate him from it. However, be it the one way or the other, the fact in this country is all contrary to the Baronet's repreſentation. We have an hierarchy in England it is true, but it is bland, mild, and without tyranny; and we have a religious eſtabliſhment, but it is not a burden, an evil as he is pleaſed to term it, but regular, decent, and

unoppreſſive,

unoppreſſive. His example of the Dean of Lincoln's curate makes nothing at all againſt it, although he moſt probably meant that it ſhould. Does the curate well ſupply the place of the Dean of Lincoln in his abſence? Does he perform the duty of this moſt extenſive pariſh as he ought? If he does (and doubtleſs, as he is a reſpectable clergyman, he does perform it as he ought), what ground is there of complaint? But take the Baronet's own words: "The miſerable and inadequate proviſion made for the major part of the parochial clergy is alſo a ſerious grievance. In the place where I live the reſpectable clergyman, with a numerous family, does the duty of a moſt extenſive pariſh for ſixty pounds a year, while from the ſame pariſh the Dean of Lincoln receives a thouſand per annum for doing nothing at all." Here then firſt it occurs to aſk, how this matter is any concern of Sir Brooke Boothby's: may not the Dean of Lincoln and another clergyman make an agreement between themſelves, without the interference of this worthy Baronet? It is not a matter of public concern, the public have nothing to do with a private agreement between two individuals: it

is

is their concern, and their concern only: and Sir Brooke might with equal propriety interfere between the tradesman and the foreman in his shop, who does all the work of it, while his master receives the profit, without perhaps doing any thing at all. The Dean of Lincoln employs this clergyman because he consents to be employed: he gives him sixty pounds a year for doing the duty of the parish, because he consents to take sixty pounds a year for doing it. Hath any one a right to interfere here? or can it be the concern of any but the two contracting parties? What hath Sir Brooke Boothby to do with how much the Dean of Lincoln receives out of the parish, while he takes care to have a proper substitute to do the duty of the parish? If he could not procure a substitute, he must do the duty himself; but he hath procured a substitute, and such an one as is acknowledged to be a respectable one, and by whom the parish duties are all duly performed. What then is it to the purpose, either how much the Dean pays, or how much he receives? It is pleasant enough to hear laymen complain of the "miserable and inadequate provision made for the major part of the parochial

chial clergy," when that miſerable and inadequate proviſion is chiefly owing to the tranſactions in their own favour under Henry the Eighth: then the major part of the parochial clergy were ſtripped of what would have been an adequate proviſion for them; and now they who are fattening on the ſpoils complain of the miſerable proviſion which themſelves are the occaſion of. It is pleaſant alſo to hear thoſe who are advocates for the poverty of the clergy lamenting and complaining of their being ſo poor. Religion muſt not exalt her mitred front in courts and parliaments; but her miniſters muſt be reduced to their primitive diſtreſs and poverty, wandering about in ſheep ſkins and goat ſkins, being deſtitute, afflicted, tormented, that we may be enabled to ſay of them, as was ſaid of their predeceſſors, that the world was not worthy of them. But then again religion muſt not be ſo depreſſed, and her miniſters ſo pinched in their circumſtances, as the poor curate of Sir Brooke's pariſh, whoſe miſerable proviſion of ſixty pounds a year Sir Brooke thinks a ſerious grievance, for no other reaſon, as it ſhould ſeem, but becauſe a Dean of Lincoln has more. As the curate

is a reſpectable man, it were to be wiſhed he had as many hundreds by the year as he has pounds; but let no one complain of his having only ſixty pounds a year, if he can aſſign no other reaſon of his complaint but that a Dean of Lincoln has a thouſand. This circumſtance relative to the curate of Sir Brooke's pariſh having diverted us for a while from conſidering the reaſon and propriety of religious eſtabliſhments, let us now proceed to conſider that ſubject. However, before we quite take our leave of Sir Brooke, let a word be whiſpered in his ear. He ſays a Dean of Lincoln has an income of a thouſand a year, and does nothing for it. Pray how much more does Sir Brooke for the income which he himſelf receives? and yet the incomes of both Sir Brooke and the Dean are held under the ſame tenure, and by the ſame ſecurity,—the laws of ſociety. Should not the worthy Baronet take care how he ſets a ſtone rolling, which he may not be able to ſtop, till it has done miſchief to himſelf. This hint perhaps may be worth attending to. But to the ſubject of eſtabliſhments.

A religious eſtabliſhment is that religion which a ſtate hath adopted and eſtabliſhed to be

be its own religion, and the religion of all its members; comprehending under the term its doctrines, faith, modes of worſhip, and officiating miniſters, with their reſpective appointments; and, in ſhort, all thoſe other circumſtances, whatever they are, which are neceſſary toward the public profeſſion of the religion, to be the religion of the ſtate. A ſtate cannot be ſaid to have any religion at all except it be eſtabliſhed, and have protection and preference above the other religions of the world. Suppoſe a ſtate to be divided by equal portions, and to conſiſt of Jews, Mahometans, Deiſts, and Chriſtians, what would be the religion of that ſtate if there was no eſtabliſhment? You could not call it particularly either Jewiſh or Mahometan, or Deiſtical or Chriſtian, becauſe it would be as much the one as the other: you could not call it a compound of them all, becauſe being ſo diſcordant, ſo diametrically oppoſite to each other, they admit not of compoſition; therefore it would be a ſtate conſiſting of Jews, Mahometans, Deiſts, and Chriſtians, undiſtinguiſhed by any religion of its own; conſequently a ſtate without an eſtabliſhment is a ſtate without any religion of its own, for it is the eſtab-

liſhment of it that determines what is its religion. Here then, if religion is of conſequence to human ſtates, we ſee the reaſon why the religion ſhould be eſtabliſhed, becauſe without eſtabliſhment it could not be the religion of the ſtate. And of conſequence religion moſt aſſuredly is to ſtates, and of the moſt intereſting conſequence; for by it the exerciſe of every thing that is good and amiable is bound upon us, not only by human power, but by a power ſuperior to all that is human; a power at which men tremble while they reſiſt, and againſt which their reſiſtance will enſure to them nothing but to be infinitely undone. But the neceſſity of religion to a ſtate is ſo admirably, ſo unexceptionably diſplayed, with ſo much fervency of truth and energy of reaſoning, in Mr. Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France; a publication which it is almoſt a ſin for an Engliſhman not to be in poſſeſſion of; that it ſuperſedes all occaſion for being more particular upon the ſubject here. However, that we may not appear altogether to have forſaken the ſubject, let us conſider ſome of the objections which are made to religious eſtabliſhments.

It is objected to religious eſtabliſhments, that they circumſcribe and limit religion itſelf, and prohibit, as far as they extend, the worſhip of God, except according to one mode only; and, in the uncouth language of Mr. Pain, "under the figure of an eſtabliſhed church, men will not ſuffer their Maker to receive the varied tythes of man's devotion." This objection, probably, the reader will think inſufferably idle; but as it is urged by others of a leſs frantic turn and temper than Pain, it may be worth while to give it a diſtinct anſwer, which otherwiſe it would not deſerve.

When a religion is eſtabliſhed to be the religion of a particular ſtate, it can need no proof that the laws of this eſtabliſhment extend no farther than the ſtate itſelf, therefore theſe varied tythes of devotion out of the ſtate may be paid juſt in the ſame manner as if there was no eſtabliſhment. Within the ſtate indeed the devotion is limited to be uniform and one; but then who has any right to complain of this but the members of the ſtate? But they do not, and, moreover, cannot complain of it, becauſe it is their own act and deed: voluntarily they choſe and

adopted the religion to be their own, and eſtabliſhed it, with all its rites of worſhip and devotion. Various tythes of devotion they have none to offer up, for they are all unanimous: from a variety of hearts indeed their devotion proceeds; but they have all the ſame praiſes of God in their mouths. What ground then, what right of objection, can there be to this? May not a ſtate have a religion of its own as well as you; and if it may, is it culpable becauſe it protects and prefers its own choice? You prefer your religion, be it what it will, and you have a natural right to do ſo, if you think fit: do not then deny that right to the ſtate which, in your own caſe, you yourſelf lay claim to and exerciſe.

The pretence that an eſtabliſhment circumſcribes and limits religion itſelf, is all imaginary. The agreement and union of many minds in one mode of performing their devotion to God, and the combining and forming themſelves into one body for that purpoſe, no more operates towards the limitation of religion itſelf, than if the individuals of which a ſtate conſiſts were to continue diſtinct from, and unconnected with, each

each other. In their diſtinct and ſeparate ſtate their minds would be the ſame as to religion as in their union, and conſequently they would each in their ſeparate ſtate be as much a check upon religion, as when they were connected together. But then this, if objected to, would bring us to that ſtrangeſt of all aſſertions, that any particular religion, whether of an individual or of a ſtate, is pernicious, as being a check upon religion itſelf. Perhaps this is what is aimed at; and the outcry againſt religious eſtabliſhments is in order to bring us to become men of all religions; ſo that it may be indifferent to us whether we worſhip with the Siamite or the Gentoo, with the wild Arab or the African. And it is pretty remarkable that Mr. Pain, without diſguiſe, declares himſelf not to be of *any ſectarian religion*; by which, if he means any thing at all, he muſt mean, that he is of no particular religion, and of courſe that all religions are to him alike. Are his patrons and admirers, the Conſtitutional Society, of the ſame way of thinking? If they are, it is no matter how ſoon they withdraw themſelves to the continent; for if they are of opinion that all religions are the ſame, and

that there is no way of religion which is the true and the right way, they ought to have their habitation only with thoſe who are as mad and as frantic as themſelves.

But if men of one and the ſame religion are formed into a ſociety, in the eſtabliſhment of their religion they exclude every one from being members of their ſociety, or admit them into it but partially, who do not comply with and conform to the laws of that eſtabliſhment. Let it be granted that they do, what then or how are the intereſts of religion injured by this? If you are not of the ſame religion as the ſociety, why ſhould you wiſh to become a member of it? If by the laws of the eſtabliſhment you are excluded from being a member, doth that excluſion deprive you of your religion, or in any reſpect interrupt you in the practice of it? You have your liberty, and the ſociety has a right to have its liberty. The ſociety does nothing but what every ſociety has a right to do. As it has voluntarily adopted a religion, and eſtabliſhed it to be the religion of the ſociety, it has a right to maintain it in its eſtabliſhment, and to admit to the privileges of the ſociety thoſe only who will concur in the mainte-

nance

nance of what it has eſtabliſhed. But how can concurrence be expected from thoſe who are inimical to the eſtabliſhment, who have a religion of their own different from, perhaps diametrically oppoſite to, the religion of the ſociety? The admiſſion of ſuch as theſe would be to act, not indirectly, but directly, againſt itſelf. It would be to proclaim its own folly in the extreme, by a voluntary contribution of its own endeavours to defeat its own purpoſes. If an individual has a right to make choice of any particular religion (it is his concern to take care that he makes choice of the true religion), a ſociety conſiſting of a number of aſſociated individuals hath a right to do the ſame; and if it hath a right to chooſe, it hath a right to maintain its choice. The intereſts of the true religion can ſuffer no inconvenience from hence, for that which is the true religion will ſtill continue to be ſuch, notwithſtanding all the eſtabliſhments in the world, and they who are wiſe and worthy will as certainly adopt it. If the ſociety has made choice of the true religion to eſtabliſh it, this moſt aſſuredly cannot be prejudicial to the intereſts of religion. If it has made choice of what is not the

the true religion, ſtill the intereſts of religion will ſuffer nothing from its eſtabliſhment; for the eſtabliſhment is only for thoſe within its own circle, and they that are without it are not at all affected by it. That the religion of Mahomet is eſtabliſhed in Turkey, how does that affect Chriſtians who do not live in Turkey? or how could it affect the Chriſtians who do live there, if they were ſuffered to enjoy their Chriſtianity with the ſame freedom as the various denominations of Deiſts, Socinians, Sectaries, &c. have in England? Let it be remembered, that in England no compulſion is uſed; a man may or may not comply with the eſtabliſhment; and after he has complied he may, if he thinks fit, withdraw himſelf, and refuſe any farther compliance. This hath been the caſe with Mr. Lindſay and a few others, and what injury has been done to them on this account? None. If we think they have acted unwiſely, ſtill we think they have acted like honeſt men; and if we lay any blame on their judgment, we ſtill allow greatly for them as having acted conſcientiouſly. Why, if you have not the religious principles of a ſociety, are you angry at its religious eſtabliſhment?

Or

MAHARAJA SERFOJI'S

Or what harm is derived to you from it? You would not ſurely wiſh to have communion with thoſe perſons with whom, on account of your oppoſite principles, you can have no communion; and if you can have no communion, you cannot think yourſelves injured becauſe you are not allowed thoſe emoluments to which communion alone would entitle you.

Upon the whole then, we may ſecurely pronounce that religious eſtabliſhments bring no prejudice to the intereſts of religion; for religion means either the true, or a falſe and corrupted religion. The latter no reaſonable man will be an advocate for, as no ſuch man can approve of falſehood and corruption; and therefore, whatever inconvenience it may ſuffer from eſtabliſhments, there is no room for complaint. The former ſtands on its own baſis, on the baſis of eternal truth; and whether a religion oppoſite to it be or be not eſtabliſhed, it makes no manner of difference to it, if it doth not operate by violence and perſecution. If the eſtabliſhment of a falſe or corrupted religion operates by oppreſſion and perſecution, the true religion will undoubtedly be ſubject to temporal inconveniences,

and

and in ſuch a caſe, and ſuch a caſe only, will an eſtabliſhment be prejudicial.

But if it be urged againſt religious eſtabliſhments that the temporal emoluments which accompany them naturally have a tendency to attach the miniſters of religion to the world and its corrupt and evil manners, and thereby to entail indelible diſgrace even upon religion itſelf; that theſe emoluments, inſtead of being the natural human means of making religion eſtimable, have contributed more than any thing elſe towards making it contemptible; that eſtabliſhments, with the riches accompanying them in foreign countries, cauſe many of the ſuperior orders of the clergy to be infidels; that there is ground for ſuſpecting the ſame even in this country; and that, in ſhort, they cauſe the clergy in general to be ſervile and dependent, ready to concur with any meaſures of government, let them be what they will, in hopes of procuring favour to themſelves, and of obtaining greater preferments; and therefore "that Chriſtianity can never be reſtored to its priſtine ſtate, and recover its real dignity and efficacy, till it be diſengaged from all connexion with civil power."

These

These objections of Dr. Priestley to Christian establishments appear to be extremely wild and undigested. The facts ought to have been authenticated that Christian establishments are the causes of infidelity among the superior orders of the clergy. However true it may be, that abroad the superior orders of the clergy are unbelievers, yet where is the proof of it? And if it was proved, where is the proof that they are so because they are rich; and that they would not have been so, if they had been poor? Surely there is no necessary connection between wealth and infidelity, there may be between it and immorality; but it is hardly conceivable that wealth should have such an influence over a man's mind as to cause him to disbelieve that which he would believe, if he had not wealth. If a man with ten hundred a year, from the convictions of his mind by the operations of truth upon it, is a believer, will he not be a believer if he has ten thousand a year? Why should he not? In this latter case the convictions of his mind will be just the same as in the former; and therefore there is no reason why he should not be a believer with ten thousand a year, as well as with ten hundred. Consequently

quently the infidelity among the ſuperior orders of the clergy abroad, if any ſuch exiſts, cannot be owing to the riches which accompany eſtabliſhments, but muſt be owing to ſome other cauſe. With equal truth it is aſſerted, that eſtabliſhments make the clergy in general ſervile and dependent. This is a philoſophical paradox which muſt be left to philoſophers to explain. With our plain underſtandings we have always conceived that an independent proviſion for the clergy (and ſuch is the proviſion made for them by the eſtabliſhment) tended to make them independent: but philoſophers ſoar higher than we can, and with them an independent proviſion makes the clergy ſervile and dependent. But after all, what is the ſervility and dependence which the independence of the clergy is the cauſe of? It cauſes them, it ſeems, to concur with any meaſures of government, let them be what they will, in hopes of obtaining favour to themſelves, and greater preferments. If this is true, the clergy muſt be a moſt worthleſs, profligate race of mortals, to concur with government in meaſures of oppreſſion and ruin to their country, merely for the chance of getting a hundred or two

more

more of income to themſelves. That a man with an hundred a year income ſhould be glad to have two hundred, or he that hath three to have four hundred, is not at all improbable. It is all in human nature. But that a man, for the ſake of an increaſe of income, ſhould concur in bringing ruin upon his country, wherein ruin to himſelf likewiſe would be inevitable, is ſo exceedingly oppoſite to the common nature of human creatures, that we muſt be excuſed in ſaying that it cannot be true; or if one ſuch inſtance could be found, that no ſearch would enable us to find another. When philoſophers are brandiſhing and flouriſhing their weapons, they care not who is in their way, or what miſchief they may do. Thus having flouriſhed away upon the evils of eſtabliſhments, and of a clergy that is ſupported by them, in the fire of their exertions they fall furiouſly upon government, which they repreſent as purſuing ſuch meaſures as no man of honour or virtue could encourage, none except a parcel of clerical miſcreants, who, for the ſake of procuring favour to themſelves, and of obtaining greater preferments, would concur with any meaſures of government,

ment, let them be what they would. But if eſtabliſhments are the cauſes that the clergy are ſuch miſcreants, let us put a caſe, and ſuppoſe there were no eſtabliſhments. As it is ordained that they who preach the goſpel ſhould live of the goſpel, the clergy muſt have a maintenance ſome how or other, and, as all will not have an equal maintenance (at leaſt till philoſophy has gained an eſtabliſhment), ſome will be better provided for than others, and in this caſe conſequently he that hath leſs will be wiſhing for that which is more; and if he would be a miſcreant under an eſtabliſhment, would be a miſcreant out of one, and exert all his endeavours to accompliſh his wiſh, and by any means to gain that which is more. Now then where is the evil to the clergy in an eſtabliſhment which would not be an evil, and a means of corrupting them out of an eſtabliſhment? It is fooliſh to ſay that the emoluments, where there was no eſtabliſhment, would not be ſo great as where there was one, nor the temptation ſufficient to corrupt them. The temptation does not ariſe from the very great magnitude of the emolument (for fifty pounds a year to a man who

has only ten will be as great a temptation as five thouſand a year will be to him that has only one thouſand; and ſo the ſame in greater or leſſer ſums of a ſimilar proportion); but the temptation ariſes from the ſpirit of covetouſneſs foſtered and cheriſhed in the heart, whereby thirty pieces of ſilver were as effectual in making Judas betray his Maſter, as thirty thouſand pounds would have been. Talk no longer therefore ſo idly, as that eſtabliſhments are the cauſes of corruptions amongſt the clergy. Corruptions, where any ſuch are, would as certainly be prevalent where there were no eſtabliſhments as where there were, and therefore moſt ſhallow and ſuperficial muſt be his mode of reaſoning, who urges "that Chriſtianity can never be reſtored to its priſtine ſtate, and recover its real dignity and efficacy, till it be diſengaged from all connection with civil power." Let us examine this ſaying a little.

"Chriſtianity can never be reſtored to its priſtine ſtate." What is here meant by the priſtine ſtate of Chriſtianity, if thereby is meant its firſt original ſtate under the firſt preachers of the goſpel, that ſtate was

a ſtate

a ſtate of diſtreſs, difficulty, and perſecution; the civil power was all againſt them, and the world was ſo prejudiced to their diſadvantage, by the follies of philoſophy, that it concurred with the civil power in endeavouring utterly to extinguiſh them; therefore, if by reſtoring Chriſtianity to its priſtine ſtate is meant the reſtoring it to that ſtate in which it was at firſt, when all the powers of the world were its enemies, we freely acknowledge that it cannot be reſtored to ſuch a ſtate without being diſengaged from all connection with the civil power. But would this be a deſirable ſtate? is it a thing to be wiſhed that all the world ſhould be an enemy to the Chriſtian name? have Chriſtians been labouring and ſuffering for ages for the ſole purpoſe of ſubduing the world to the faith of their revered Maſter? have the prophecies been multiplied and fulfilled, that kings ſhould be the nurſing fathers, and queens the nurſing mothers, of the Chriſtian church? and are we now told that we muſt renounce their cheriſhing patronage, and that Chriſtianity cannot recover its real dignity and efficacy without it? With what ſhameleſs folly, as well as effrontery, is this urged; without

a doubt

a doubt the primitive Chriſtians had a dignity in enduring the malice and perſecutions of the world; they had an efficacy in converting the heathen world to the faith of Chriſt, which it is impoſſible we can have, becauſe perſecutions have ceaſed; and heatheniſm, unleſs philoſophers ſhould introduce it again, wants not to be convinced or confuted. But can any one be ſuch a madman as to wiſh that the world was once more reduced to the ſame deplorable ſtate? Can the miniſters of Chriſt have no dignity except they are perſecuted? nor Chriſtianity recover its efficacy except oppoſed to the blaſphemy of an heathen world? Chriſtianity hath an innate dignity of its own, and its truth an efficacy independent on perſecutions or heatheniſm; and it would be fixing a moſt ſtrange character upon it if, after having converted the world to itſelf, it was to become good for nothing until it was again deſerted and perſecuted.

But it ſeems ſome good and worthy men have fallen into the miſtaken notion, that the acceptation which Chriſtianity has met with in the world, and the favours which have been beſtowed upon its miniſters, have

been the causes of its corruptions; and that less dignity, and more poverty, would be a means of reforming these corruptions. But this notion is too hastily adopted. Look through the whole of the Christian ministry in this kingdom, and then say, whether you find more or greater corruptions among those who have dignity and wealth, or among those who have neither; and if you find, as the fact really is, that there are infinitely greater disorders among the lower ranks of the clergy than among those who are of the superior and distinguished orders, you will have reason sufficient to be persuaded that your notion is a mistaken one. You will not, surely, say that the irregularities among the lower clergy are owing to their poverty, and the want of a competent provision; for this will be to argue against yourself. For if their poverty is the cause of their irregular conduct, the same poverty, if introduced among the superior orders, would, in all probability, produce the same effect among them, if poverty were the necessary cause of corruptions among the clergy. But neither poverty nor wealth are the real, or any, cause at all of misconduct in a truly Christian clergyman,

whoſe character it is, that he knows both how to abound, and how to ſuffer want. A bad man wants not temptation to be a bad man from the emoluments of a dignified ſtation, and a good man will not become a profligate becauſe he is poor; we muſt therefore look for the cauſes of profligacy among eccleſiaſtics, where it exiſts elſewhere than in their poor or their exalted ſtations.

It hath been ſaid, that our Maſter hath declared, that his kingdom is not of this world; and moreover, that when he himſelf was upon earth he had not where to lay his head; that, therefore, the eſtabliſhment of an hierarchy, and the grandeur and worldly pomp of archbiſhops, biſhops, and other dignified clergy, very ill ſuits with the character of his ſervants. That our Maſter's kingdom is not of this world is moſt certain; but then it is a kingdom nevertheleſs, and as ſuch, it hath its various and ſubordinate ſtations and ranks: and whether wealth be annexed or not to the ſtation, one ſtation will be ſuperior to, and have the pre-eminence above another; and wealth will neither add any thing to the dignity of the ſtation, nor will poverty diminiſh ought from it. While,

therefore, we ſay the kingdom of Chriſt hath its various ſubordinate ſtations and ranks, as the kingdoms of the world have, we ſtill ſay it derives not its dignity from what gives dignity to the kingdoms of the world, neither is its dominion obtained by worldly power and policy. The empire of Chriſt is over the heart and mind, ſubjugating, by the inſtrumentality of the powers of truth, and not by inſtruments of war, every thought to his obedience. It therefore, moſt certainly, is not a kingdom of this world, becauſe its principles are ſo different from the principles of worldly kingdoms. But becauſe wealth and wordly honours make no addition to the dignity of the ſervants of Chriſt, are they by that prohibited from having them? or are they inconſiſtent with the character they hold of being his ſervants? May not a world, which hath been ſo eſſentially benefited by their doctrine, and bright and ſhining examples, beſtow upon them ſuch temporal honours and rewards as a world hath to diſpoſe of? and, if it finds various ranks and orders among them, may it not diſtribute, in gradation, thoſe rewards and honours, ſo that an archbiſhop, or a biſhop, ſhall have a greater proportion of

its temporal gifts than thoſe who are in an inferior ſtation? If you ſay this is not to be allowed, becauſe Chriſt's kingdom is not of this world, by the ſame rule neither may they eat or drink, or wear clothing, or, becauſe he had not where to lay his head, dwell in houſes. You forget that while Chriſt's kingdom is not of this world it is exerciſed in it, and that thoſe who are ſet apart for his ſervice and miniſtry are men as truly, and appertain to the world as certainly, as thoſe who are not. What they are capable of as men they may have, they are permitted to have. They may uſe the world, but not abuſe it. The outcry, therefore, againſt eccleſiaſtics on account of the temporal poſſeſſions ſecured to them by the eſtabliſhment, is all low artifice and chicanery.

But let us ſay that no temporal proviſion whatever was made for the clergy in this or in any other country, and that they depended ſolely upon what their fellow Chriſtians might chooſe to give them. What then would be the conſequence? It deſerves to be conſidered.

But let us premiſe, that as the world is now, or at leaſt is ſuppoſed, to be Chriſtian,

the office of a Chriſtian miniſter is now very different from what it was at the firſt beginning of the goſpel. Then it was to communicate to the world a wiſdom which it knew not, to draw men off from the follies of a falſe philoſophy by which they were bewitched, and to eſtabliſh truth as its ſuperior; to ſtem all the torrents of oppoſition by their ſufferings, and to ſubdue the powers of the world by the croſs of Chriſt: and, this being the commiſſion which they had in charge to execute, temporal emoluments they paid very little attention to; and having food and raiment, that is, what was ſufficient to ſupport nature in the execution of their charge, they had leiſure for nothing more; more would only have interrupted them. Houſes, lands, and other poſſeſſions under their then commiſſion, would have been of no uſe to them, they were incompatible with the truſt committed to them. But now the wiſdom which the firſt preachers had to communicate, hath been communicated; the world hath received it, and ſubmitted itſelf, without any oppoſition or perſecution, to the croſs of Chriſt, and the Chriſtian church hath been formed. The buſineſs of a Chriſtian clergyman,

clergyman, therefore, now is to officiate with holineſs in that church, to exert himſelf ſeduloully for the preſervation and continuance of it in peace and unity, and to live a good Chriſtian among Chriſtians. Now as the buſineſs of a Chriſtian miniſter is ſo materially different from what it was at firſt, the motives, the ſtimulus to undertake it, become leſs preſſing and urgent. The conqueſt of the world, the deſtruction of the kingdom of the devil, the diſſipation of error, and the eſtabliſhment of truth, are no longer the chief objects he has in view, for theſe have been already effected. The objects he has in view are to be beneficial and of ſervice by his miniſtry to his fellow Chriſtians, to ſerve them by a labour of love. But will theſe objects alone, without any other aid, be a ſufficient ſtimulus to the undertaking the miniſtry, eſpecially when that miniſtry hath no other ſupport but the uncertain and precarious alms and contributions of thoſe who may give or withhold as they think proper? Allowing human nature to be what we really know and experience it to be, will men be forward to undertake the miniſtry, in order to be conſidered, in return for it, only as

 almſmen,

almſmen, and to live as it were on the donations of inſolence? Aſſuredly not; they will ſay, and it is natural for them to ſay, We are Chriſtians, and may obtain the rewards of Chriſtianity without becoming clergymen; and as the ſacred office cannot be undertaken but with a certain proſpect of poverty, at leaſt without any proſpect but of a very precarious ſubſiſtence, and that, moreover, ſubjected to the mortifying inſults of the donors, we will not undertake it; we may be Chriſtians, and good Chriſtians, in various other profeſſions where we may have an ample competence, an independent proviſion, for ourſelves and families, without any of thoſe uncomfortable mortifications neceſſarily attendant on the clerical profeſſion; and therefore we ſhall prefer any of thoſe other profeſſions. Whether in thus ſaying men will ſay right or not, is not the queſtion. But thus, undoubtedly, they will both ſay and act. Hence, ſuppoſing all eſtabliſhments, all independent proviſion for the clergy, aboliſhed, where ſhall we find perſons bold enough to take upon themſelves the ſacred profeſſion? and if the profeſſion be once loſt, how long after it will Chriſtianity itſelf ſurvive?

vive? If eſtabliſhments are aboliſhed, and the clergy made to depend merely on the alms and charitable contributions of the people, what parent will ever educate his child with a view to the miniſtry? In various other profeſſions his child has a proſpect of a handſome, comfortable, and independent proviſion for himſelf: but in the miniſtry nothing preſents itſelf to his view but diſtreſs and inſult; nothing but what a generous mind would diſdain to ſtoop to except under the greateſt of neceſſity. The parent, therefore, who has any regard for the temporal welfare of his child, will prefer almoſt any employment or profeſſion for him before that of the miniſtry. Let the Chriſtian clergyman be able to live (and why ſhould he not?) as comfortably and as independently as other Chriſtians live, and the objection to the miniſtry will be removed; while there is eſtabliſhed for the order thoſe various gradations of dignity and advantage, which are the greateſt beauties of other ſtates of life, it will be an encouragement to men to enter into it, and prefer it before other profeſſions. But if the order is degraded, and preſents nothing to the view but penury and diſtreſs;

or if in holding out a proviſion, it holds out nothing but the proviſion of a pauper in an alms-houſe, whatever encouragement it may afford to paupers to enter into it, it will afford encouragement to none others.

Theſe things ought to be well and ſeriouſly conſidered, not only by thoſe who are enemies to any ſtated revenues for the clergy, but by thoſe who are projecting a new model and diſtribution of thoſe revenues. Moſt certain it is that the molten produce of the eccleſiaſtical revenues, when poured out of the crucible of a philoſophical fancy, may be diſtributed in a very different manner from the preſent diſtribution of them, whereby the ſuperior clergy will have a great deal leſs, and the inferior clergy a very little more. But will any real advantage accrue to religion from hence? will the duties of Chriſtianity be more perfectly complied with? will the morals of mankind in general be improved by it? ſhall we have brighter or more ſhining examples of goodneſs in the world if the revenues of Canterbury or Durham are diminiſhed in order to increaſe the revenue of a Welch biſhoprick! or to add five or ten pounds a year more to the income of a Welch

vicar?

vicar? For what good end then ſhould any ſuch project as this be; I do not ſay put in execution, but even thought of?

The project of a more equal diſtribution of the eccleſiaſtical revenues is unjuſt. For the revenues of the ſuperior clergy never appertained to, never hardly, in any inſtance, made a part of the revenues of the inferior clergy. The revenues of the inferior clergy were diminiſhed and alienated from them for the ſupport of the monaſtic inſtitutions by the uſurped power of the popes. The inferior clergy were never made poor in order to enrich Canterbury or Durham, but for the ſupport of ſuperſtition and monkery. Why, therefore, ſhould theſe, or any other cathedrals, be robbed for the ſake of making amends to thoſe whom they have never injured? If it would be unjuſt, and unjuſt it moſt aſſuredly would be, to make the innocent pay that which he never robbed, to make the innocent ſuffer for crimes of which he was never guilty; then is the project of a new diſtribution of the eccleſiaſtical revenues founded in deep injuſtice, as well as folly; I ſay folly, becauſe it would not anſwer the end propoſed, for numbers after the

diſtribution

distribution would still be destitute of a competence for themselves and families.

A restlessness of spirit, when once it takes possession of a man, is ever pushing him on into innovations; he cannot be contented with things as they are, they pall upon the view; he calls for change and variety, as the vitiated stomach does; but change and variety can no more satisfy him than it can the vitiated stomach; therefore he roves on from change to change, till he is bewildered in the *summum bonum* of novelty, or till the final closing of his eyes bids his perturbed spirit rest. Deans and chapters, it seems, according to the project, are to be abolished, that we may see, it is to be presumed, how very different the kingdom would look when they were abolished, and how much more religious and devout we should be, when there were no morning and evening sacrifices daily offered up unto God, as now in our cathedrals. With the cathedral revenues and services are to go our Creeds likewise, that the lack of faith in the Christian may be as apparent as his lack of subsistence; and indeed, with some, the abolition of our Creeds seems to be an object upon which they are more intent than any

thing

thing elſe. The product of a mind worked up into a foam, is the following rhapſodical apoſtrophe: "Raſh expoſitors of points of doubtful diſputation! intolerant fabricators of metaphyſical creeds and incongruous ſyſtems of theology! do you undertake to meaſure the extent of any man's underſtanding, except your own? to eſtimate the ſtrength and origin of his habits of thinking? to appreciate his merit or demerit in the uſe of the talent which God has given him, ſo as unerringly to pronounce that the belief of this or that doctrine is neceſſary to his ſalvation?" In anſwer to this very extraordinary rhapſody it is replied, that the fabricators of creeds do not undertake to meaſure the extent of any man's underſtanding, nor to appreciate his merit or demerit in the uſe of the talent which God has given him. I believe, according to the doctrines of the Apoſtles, the Nicene and Athanaſian creeds: does my belief meaſure the extent of your underſtanding? what has it to do with the ſtrength of your habits of thinking? Your underſtanding, if it is as dark as *Erebus*, will ſtill continue to be ſo, let my belief be what it will. Why, moreover, are the fabricators of creeds called *intolerant*?

It

It is you that are intolerant—you, who exclaim against our creeds, who are uſing all your endeavours that we may *not be tolerated* in the profeſſion of them. We believe the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghoſt, to be one God, and we believe it becauſe we were baptized into the *name* of that one God, and we think it neceſſary to our ſalvation that we ſhould believe it; and becauſe we think it neceſſary to our own ſalvation, therefore we think it neceſſary to be believed by all thoſe who would be ſaved with us, and becauſe we think that we ourſelves ſhould periſh everlaſtingly, if we did not believe it, therefore we profeſs the ſame of all others who do not believe it. Is this intolerance? Are we to be abuſed and vilified for this? Then is faith intolerance, becauſe it is not unbelief; and he that believes there is a God ought to be vilified and abuſed becauſe he is not an Atheiſt. The Athanaſian Creed, which it is become a faſhion to ſpeak againſt, is ſpoken againſt either through want of knowledge, or through a ſpirit very different from want of knowledge, and much leſs excuſable. Whoever believes the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghoſt, to be the one and the only God, believes all that is

expreſſed

expreſſed by the Athanaſian Creed; and whoever does not believe this, moſt aſſuredly does not believe the Goſpel of Jeſus Chriſt; and he that does not believe that goſpel, may look into it, if he thinks fit, and ſee what he has to truſt to. But it is ſaid, "The divine diſpleaſure is in many places denounced againſt thoſe who reject the goſpel when it has been offered to them, but is not in any one place denounced againſt thoſe who do not worſhip one *God in Trinity, and Trinity in unity, neither confounding the perſons, nor dividing the ſubſtance.*" It is true theſe latter words are not to be found in the goſpel; but the doctrine conveyed by them is to be found there; and they are uſed as a diſavowal of thoſe opinions of evil men, by whatever name or character diſtinguiſhed, who pervert the doctrine of the goſpel, either by confounding the perſons of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghoſt, as if they were not diſtinct perſons, or who, dividing the divine nature, make the Godhead to be more than one. Every man who believes that the diſtinct perſons of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghoſt, are the one, and the only God, believes all that is expreſſed or intended by the

Athanaſian

Athanaſian Creed upon the ſubject; whether he underſtands all the terms uſed in it or not. The terms are not the faith, but a diſavowal of what is not the faith. If the terms are ſcholaſtic and unſcriptural, why have evil men by their gloſſes and ſophiſtry made it neceſſary for the church to uſe them? Fools and heretics were the firſt who introduced unſcriptural terms in controverting the doctrines of ſcripture. The church would never have had any occaſion to uſe unſcriptural terms, if they would have been bound by the terms of ſcripture: but this they would not, but, wreſting and perverting them from their plainneſs and ſimplicity, gave perverſe meanings to them, ſuited to their reſpective follies and hereſies. Againſt ſuch as theſe, of what uſe would it be to urge, in the terms of ſcripture, ſo it is written, when the diſpute is, and neceſſarily muſt be, about the meaning of what is ſo written? Therefore, unſcriptural terms were by neceſſity reſorted to, becauſe men of perverſe minds would not abide by the terms as they were written: therefore were they reſorted to that the fool might receive an anſwer according to his folly. The doctrine of the Athanaſian Creed is the ge-

nuine doctrine of the gospel. If it is expressed in other terms than the plain and simple terms of the gospel, it is in order to meet the perverseness of those heretics who first departed from the simplicity of the gospel. The proposition in it that is to be believed with regard to the Divine Being, is, that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, are the one and the only true God. The terms in which this proposition is asserted are used only in opposition to heresy, and are of no consequence to the plain and humble mind which believes the proposition itself. If the plain and humble believer understands not a syllable of the terms, it is not necessary that he should understand them; they were not framed for him, but for the unbelieving heretic, and he understands them plainly enough, and therefore wants to have the Creed abolished, that it may no longer be a palladium against his subtilties and subterfuges, which he knows it is, and that it is a standing testimony against his evil doctrines. It is true, notwithstanding the Creed, some have, by craft and wiliness, crept into the church, who are enemies to that primary doctrine of the gospel which the Creed as-

ſerts, and theſe of courſe exclaim againſt it, becauſe it expoſes their perfidy and prevarication to the face of day; becauſe it oppreſſes them moſt heavily, inaſmuch as it pronounces to the world that they make profeſſion of a belief which they do not believe. But with what eaſe may they deliver themſelves from the load of this oppreſſion? Why do they not renounce the Creed, and relinquiſh the church which maintains it, as Mr. Lindſay and ſome other honeſt and conſcientious men have done? Hear their anſwer: "Do you whoſe lot it may be to live in luxury, and draw thouſands from the church, do you, in the violence of your moral virtue, in the intemperance of your religious zeal, in the over orthodoxy of your faith, do you call upon a poor clergyman who, in the humility of his ſoul, dares not ſay "by his authority committed to me, I abſolve thee from all thy ſins," or who, in the weakneſs of his intellect, cannot underſtand the meaning of the terms in which the Athanaſian doctrine of the Trinity is expreſſed, or, in the charity of his heart, ſcruples denouncing damnation on his brethren, do you call on ſuch a man to give up his preferments, to retire from the miniſtry,

niſtry, and ſtarve?" No, we do not call upon a *poor* clergyman to retire from the miniſtry and *ſtarve*; but we do call upon every man, whether rich or poor, in an inferior or more elevated ſtation, to act conſcientiouſly, and no longer to traduce that church whoſe bread he eats. If there is a revelation from God in the holy goſpels, it is a prime part of that revelation that the Son and the Holy Ghoſt are God in unity with the Father. Do you, therefore, or let any other adverſary of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, without ſophiſtry or tergiverſation, without equivocation or ſuperadded meanings of your own, produce, in the pure ſimple terms of ſcripture, a confutation of the doctrine, ſo that it ſhall appear as plainly that the ſame name is not appropriate to the Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, as by St. Matthew's goſpel it appears that it is; ſhew as plainly in ſcriptural terms only, and without gloſſes of your own, that the Son and the Holy Ghoſt *are uniformly* repreſented to us as not being God, that they are inferior to God, that they are mere creatures, that they are never called God, are never worſhipped as God, and that they never act as God; ſhew this if you can, in the plain, uniform language of ſcripture,

 without

without any glosses or superadded meanings of your own, and your opinions shall no longer be called heresy, nor yourselves heretics. But this you know you cannot do: the test of the pure scriptural terms you know you cannot stand. Your first predecessors in heresy were at the beginning obliged to depart from the pure terms of scripture, and so must you, if you would give any plausible colour to your heresy. The filthy Ebionites in the primitive ages, the Cerinthians, the Carpocratians, with others, the detested spawn of the bottomless pit, as the ecclesiastical writers call them, all acted in this manner, by departing from the pure, genuine terms of scripture, and by sophisticating them with perverse and superadded meanings of their own; and when the church, in opposition to their errors, appealed to the words of scripture, they in reply had recourse to perverse glosses and reasonings of their own, without foundation. In this case, therefore, what could the church do, other than it hath done? The pure words of scripture had no effect upon them, therefore it framed a Creed in terms of express opposition to their perverseness and falsehood, in terms not explanatory of the doctrine,

doctrine, but disavowing those unscriptural misrepresentations by which it had been corrupted. What therefore is there, can there be in the Athanasian Creed which a true believer of the doctrine, who holds the truth as it is in the scripture, can object to? They who do not hold the truth as it is in the scripture, may, and naturally will, object to it, because they are affected by it; but they who do, cannot without the most uncommon stupidity object to a Creed which asserts the very faith which they themselves profess, and which maintains it, in opposition to all those who would corrupt it.

But a word or two more concerning the Athanasian Creed. It is objected to it, that thereby the church imposes upon her members a profession of faith in terms scholastic and unscriptural; the meaning of which not one in a hundred understands, and yet imposes it as necessary to salvation; for it says, "He therefore that will be saved must thus think of the Trinity;" but he that doth not understand the terms, cannot *thus* think of the Trinity. In answer hereto it is to be observed,

1. That the Athanasian Creed is improperly so called. It is not a personal Creed, as the

other Creeds are, but a declaration of the whole Catholic church, and therefore is pronounced *alternis vicibus*. It is the Catholic church's assertion of the true scripture faith, in opposition to the glosses and sophistications whereby men of perverse minds have depraved it. The true scripture faith is, that the three distinct persons of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, are the one God. But heresy having thought fit to deprave this truth, by either confounding the persons, or dividing the substance, therefore the church pronounces that the true worship of God is without confounding the persons or dividing the substance. Because heresy represents the Son as inferior to the Father, therefore the church asserts that he is equal to the Father, as touching his Godhead; and because it represents the Son as being only like unto God, Therefore the church asserts that the Godhead of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, is all one, the glory equal, the majesty co-eternal. And, however the church, in thus asserting the faith, has recourse to scholastic and unscriptural terms, they are not terms of the church's invention, but were introduced by heresy. Thus when our

Saviour

Saviour ſays, I and the Father are One, the gloſs of hereſy is, that they are *not one by unity of ſubſtance*, but by unity of conſent only. Are the terms, "without dividing the ſubſtance," the invention of the church? Moſt manifeſtly they are not: hereſy firſt introduced them; and the church, in uſing them, uſes them only and neceſſarily in oppoſition to hereſy. By the way it may here be obſerved, that as unity of ſubſtance neceſſarily implies unity of conſent, therefore unity of conſent does not by any means exclude unity of ſubſtance, and therefore the evaſion of hereſy does no credit to the ingenuity of its orignal inventor, and in fact is a moſt wretched one. Had there been no heretical depravations of Scripture there would have been no call for, nor would there have been any creeds of human compoſition at all, not even the apoſtle's creed, but all men would have been governed, and would have abided by, the plain unſophiſticated terms of Scripture. But when hereſy invaded the purity and ſimplicity of Scripture, the church, as the guardian of the ſacred depoſit entruſted to her charge, was obliged to have recourſe to ſuch means as human language could af-

ford of refelling all evil ſuggeſtions, and of aſſerting the truth in oppoſition to them. Let this moſt certain truth be particularly attended to, that the doctrine of the divinity of the Son and of the Holy Ghoſt, and their unity with the Father, is no doctrine of the church's invention, is no doctrine deduced by forced inferences from paſſages of Scripture of uncertain interpretation, but is the plain genuine doctrine of the Scripture itſelf delivered in the plaineſt terms, and which nothing can evade but by a departure from the plainneſs and ſimplicity of thoſe terms. He that readeth in the goſpel, "I and the Father are one," what doth he read but the unity of the Son with the Father? He that readeth, "I am in the Father and the Father in me," what doth he read but this unity affirmed in the ſtrongeſt terms that human language will admit? So when the Son ſaith, "All that the Father hath are mine," how is it poſſible to invent words that more ſtrongly denote the Son's entire equality with the Father? When the apoſtle tells us, "that he thought it not robbery to be equal with God," can we deny his equality without departing from the genuine plainneſs of the

apoſtle's words? Let any plain man read theſe words in the evangeliſt, when Jeſus had ſaid to Thomas, "Be not faithleſs, but believing," "And Thomas anſwered and ſaid unto him, My Lord and my God," will he not think and tell you that Thomas here calleth Jeſus his Lord and his God? and ſo in an hundred other inſtances. Therefore the plain terms of Scripture taken, according to their plain acceptation, evidently taught the church the doctrine of Chriſt's divinity and unity with the Father, and the contrary doctrine ariſes from giving the words a meaning which the words themſelves do not preſent to us. This ought to be particularly attended to by young perſons, who, if they have ingenuous minds, may convince themſelves of the truth of it by an examination of the Scripture.

2d. As to the objection that he who doth not underſtand the terms of the Athanaſian Creed, cannot thus think of the Trinity, as the creed requires he ſhould in order to his ſalvation. In anſwer to this it is replied, that he who believeth the plain ſimple doctrine of Scripture believeth as the creed requires, becauſe he believeth, without any of thoſe

those depravations of the Scripture faith, and sophistry, which the creed is in opposition to, and therefore as he has the very *same faith* as he would have if he understood all the terms of the creed, and believed according to them, he doth in reality and truth, although he may not understand one single term of the creed, thus think of the Trinity as the creed directs he should. With the heretic it is otherwise, he doth not think of the doctrine in the plain and simple terms of Scripture; and therefore of him it is said, He that would be saved must *thus* think of the Trinity, that is, in the terms used by the creed, which he can be at no loss to understand, because they are terms of his own original introduction. Let this truth also be again repeated, and it is a truth which speaks for itself without being particularly enforced, that had there been no heresies, no depravations of the plainness and simplicity of the Scripture, there never would have been any creeds framed of human composition. But heresies there were almost even from the beginning, therefore was framed the creed which goes by the name of the apostles. Therefore, when Arius broached his detestable heresy, did the whole

whole Chriſtian world aſſemble together, and condemning, *uno ore*, his abominable doctrine, the Nicene Creed was framed; and therefore, when hereſies continued to prevail, the church thought fit to declare and publiſh her own general faith in oppoſition to all the various hereſies at that time known, with clauſes determining it to be neceſſary that every man ſhould hold the true faith whole and undefiled, and that if he did not, without doubt, he ſhould periſh everlaſtingly. So that the Athanaſian Creed is not a piece of conjuration, *legerdemain hocus pocus*, as heretical witticiſm, for want of argument, delighteth to term it; neither is it calculated to perplex the minds and conſciences of men, but it is the Catholic church of Chriſt's declaration and aſſertion of the true genuine faith required by the goſpel, in ſuch terms as the perverſeneſs of heretical depravity rendered it neceſſary to make uſe of. It is framed purely againſt hereſy, and the true believer, in the genuine doctrine of the goſpel, is no more affected by it than if it never had been made, or he had never heard of it; and, therefore, that any true ſincere believer of the doctrine ſhould wiſh to get rid of a

creed

creed which ſo ſtrongly aſſerts and maintains the faith which he believes, is what never can be ſufficiently wondered at. But,

3. It is urged that the damnatory clauſes are harſh and unchriſtian; that they condemn, indiſcriminately, without making any allowances for the weakneſs and imperfections of different minds. This objection, as far as it goes, ſuppoſes that a matter of faith is like a mathematical propoſition, whoſe truth will be admitted according to the ſtrength of the mind which diſcuſſes it. But a matter of faith is not to be diſcuſſed by the mathematician's rule. In faith it is ſufficient that a man underſtands what the fact is that is to be believed, and that he is convinced of the authority upon which it is believed. The King of Siam fully underſtood what the fact was for water to become a ſolid; and had he been ſatisfied of the jeſuit's authority, who aſſerted the poſſibility of it, he would have believed it poſſible; but he was not ſatisfied with the jeſuit's authority, and therefore he required other evidence for the truth of it, beſides his word: and as it was a fact which might be ſubmitted to the determination of his ſenſes, therefore had he a right to inſiſt upon

upon its being ſo ſubmitted, and to withhold his aſſent to the truth of the fact if it was not ſo. In like manner, after our Saviour's reſurrection with the ſame body which was crucified, Thomas, when he was told of the fact, would not believe it except he had other authority than that of thoſe who told him of it. "Except (ſays he) I ſhall ſee in his hands the print of the nails, and put my finger into the print of the nails, and thruſt my hand into his ſide, I will not believe." Here was a fact told him of which his ſenſes were capable of being the judges, and therefore had he a right, and inſiſted upon its being ſubmitted to their judgment; he was gratified, and was convinced. But in matters of faith, relative to the being and nature of the inviſible God, where are the ſenſes to which they can be ſubmitted, where is the mind which, by the ſtrength of its abſtraction, can determine either the truth or falſehood of the propoſition ſubmitted to it. The propoſition is clear, plain, and intelligible, even by the meaneſt capacity; that there is one Perſon of the Father, another Perſon of the Son, and another of the Holy Ghoſt; but that the Godhead of the Father and of the Son, and

of

of the Holy Ghoſt, is all one. What is affirmed by this propoſition any mind can perceive if it is not inſane, let its weakneſs or imperfection be what it will; and therefore it can aſſent to, and believe it, if it thinks fit; but reaſon upon it, as to its phyſical poſſibility, it cannot. Reaſoning upon ſuch a ſubject as this is all idle, becauſe it is reaſoning without a medium. The divine nature of God ought to be fully and comprehenſively underſtood (which, while we are in the fleſh, is impoſſible) before we can ſay whether it will or will not admit three diſtinct Perſons to be in it, without any breach of its Unity; therefore the propoſition, as to its truth or falſehood, cannot be judged of by reaſoning, but muſt depend entirely upon the authority of the revelation by which it is communicated to us; and he that believes it, muſt believe it upon the alone authority of that revelation, and nothing elſe. Could the Being of God be ſubjected to our ſcrutiny and examination, as the body of our Saviour after his crucifixion, we might withhold our aſſent to any propoſition concerning it until it had undergone that ſcrutiny and examination; but as any ſuch ſcrutiny and examination is impoſſible,

impoſſible, whatever we believe or know concerning the being and nature of the God-head, muſt be by ſome authoriſed revelation which we cannot reject by reaſon of the authority on which it ſtands. Such authoriſed revelation Chriſtians acknowledge to be the goſpel, and according to that revelation it is impoſſible for any reaſonable man, if he takes what is ſaid in it in its genuine plainneſs and ſimplicity, without any gloſſes or ſuperadded meanings of his own, not to come to this concluſion, that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghoſt, are one God.

In the days of old, prior to the days of Moſes, God was known to the antient fathers only by his name El Elohim, &c.; but by his name Jehovah was he not known to them. To Moſes, when a new diſpenſation was to take place, he revealed himſelf by his name Jehovah, that unutterable name, as the Jews call it, expreſſive of his ſelf-exiſtent being, of his being the Author of being to all others, and of his rigid and impartial juſtice; and thus he continued known to men till the fulneſs of time came, when the diſpenſation of mercy was to beam forth upon us by the manifeſtation of the Meſſiah.

Then

Then God was pleaſed to reveal himſelf by his evangelical name of mercy and love; a name as unknown to the fathers of the preceding ages as the name Jehovah was unknown to the Fathers preceding the days of Moſes, and that all men, from the higheſt to the loweſt, might know and reverence this name of the Lord their God: it was ordained that every one, who was to become a partaker in the benefits of the Chriſtian diſpenſation, ſhould be baptized in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghoſt, with this ſanction added to it, "He that believeth, and is baptized, ſhall be ſaved, but he that believeth not ſhall be damned." Surely this ſanction, this neceſſity of faith, whatever elſe it may comprehend within it, muſt extend to the neceſſity of faith in the revealed evangelical name of God: nay, from the manner in which this neceſſity is expreſſed, I think there cannot be any doubt of it. He that is baptized is baptized in the name of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghoſt. But what ſaith the Scripture? He that believeth and is baptized (that is, in the name of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghoſt), ſhall be ſaved, therefore the word *believeth* referreth

to

to the name of the Father, &c. as well as the word baptized; and the goſpel requires us to believe in, as well as to be baptized in, the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghoſt; and of courſe, when it is added, he that believeth not ſhall be damned, it means, he that believeth not in that name in which he was baptized ſhall be damned. This appears to be, without any ſubtilty or artifice, ſtrictly and literally the truth; and if it is, what doth the Athanaſian Creed, in its damnatory clauſe, ſay more than the goſpel itſelf doth? I am aware of the objection which will be urged by the philoſopher that the words, as they ſtand in St. Mark, relate to faith in the goſpel, and not to any particular doctrine. But what kind of faith that can be which believes in the goſpel, without believing in the doctrine of the goſpel, is what I own I as little underſtand as I do what is the goſpel of a philoſopher. The very firſt principle of the goſpel, and that with which its other principles are eſſentially connected, is that God is our Father, our Redeemer, and our Sanctifier. Faith, therefore, in this God ſurely muſt be as neceſſary as baptiſm in his name, for without it baptiſm

ſeems to be nothing but a mere unoperative form, inaſmuch as when it is ſaid, He that believeth, and is baptized, ſhall be ſaved, it is added, He that believeth not (however he may have been baptized) ſhall be damned; ſo that baptiſm alone, without faith, will avail nothing as to our ſalvation. But if faith and baptiſm, combined, operate together to our ſalvation, and ſo the Scripture expreſsly ſaith it does, then is the faith required to be as the baptiſm is, in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghoſt. Conſequently, when the Athanaſian Creed requires us to believe in this evangelical name of God, what doth it require more of us than the Scripture itſelf requires? Why therefore do you object to it? You believe, you ſay, in the true Scripture doctrine concerning the Trinity, but ſtill you wiſh, with Archbiſhop Tillotſon, that we were well rid of the Athanaſian Creed. The archbiſhop, doubtleſs, had his reaſons for wiſhing to be well rid of it. But ſurely you do not wiſh to be well rid of it merely becauſe he did. What are your reaſons for wiſhing to be well rid of it? You ſay you do not object to it upon your own particular account, but becauſe it gives

ſo much offence to many of your brethren who do not believe as you do: and ſo becauſe many of your brethren, who deny the faith which you yourſelf believe, and againſt whoſe evil opinions the creed is particularly framed, are offended, therefore you wiſh the creed was aboliſhed? Thieves and houſe-breakers are offended at the laws againſt diſhoneſty. Do you wiſh theſe laws were abrogated becauſe they give offence to them? you may as well wiſh the one as the other. Do you not ſee how you make a tool of yourſelf in order to forward the purpoſes of others? But, after all, what harm does the creed do to theſe your offended brethren? does it compel them to diſown their opinions? No. Does it inflict any puniſhment upon them? No. And when it threatens them with everlaſting perdition on account of their unbelief, if the threat is ill founded it never will be fulfilled upon them, and therefore is merely a *brutum fulmen*. But you urge it cauſes numbers to perſevere in their diſſenſion from the church, who, if the creed was aboliſhed, would unite themſelves to it. True, I believe, many would then profeſs themſelves members of the church, when they could do it, without

being obliged to pronounce ſentence upon themſelves: but would they at the ſame time lay aſide their evil opinions? Moſt aſſuredly they would not; and then what benefit would the church receive from their profeſſing themſelves to be members of it? Better, far better is it that they ſhould continue as they are in their diſſenſion, than that they ſhould affect to incorporate themſelves where it is not poſſible that there can be any union: for if ſuch as theſe ſhould once get free and unreſtrained admiſſion into the church, the Chriſtian faith would ſoon, very ſoon, depart out of it. He well knew what he ſaid, when he admoniſhed the Corinthians not to be unequally yoked together with unbelievers; for what communion, ſaith he, hath light with darkneſs? or what part hath he that believeth with an infidel?

But laſtly, it is urged, that the Athanaſian Creed is a violent impoſition upon the whole Chriſtian world, becauſe it requires faith in a particular doctrine as neceſſary to ſalvation; for that, without the very height of preſumption, no man "can unerringly pronounce that the belief of *this* or *that* doctrine is neceſſary to ſalvation." What then

is the goſpel, what the religion of Jeſus Chriſt? which moſt aſſuredly is the religion of faith, or it is nothing at all. And what and how melancholy is the condition of Chriſtians who are required to believe, under the penalty of damnation, and yet are left under ſuch a cloud of impenetrable darkneſs, that they are unable to pronounce unerringly what it is they are to believe in order to their ſalvation. They dare not, it ſeems, without the greateſt preſumption, pronounce that they are to believe either in *this* or *that* doctrine. Is it poſſible that ſuch a ſuggeſtion ſhould have fallen from the pen of a Chriſtian? It is more than poſſible, and who will not ſay, *Pudet pigetque.* But I forbear*.— Let us return to the ſubject of eſtabliſhments, from whence I have ſo long digreſſed.

There is an objection to eſtabliſhments, derived from the mode in which the clergy are

* If in what I have ſaid upon this ſubject, I have been free in the uſe of the terms *hereſy* and *heretic*, let me requeſt the reader to be perſuaded that thereby I have not intended to give offence to any man. They are ſcripture terms, and I know of none other that ſo pertinently diſtinguiſh between thoſe who receive and believe the plain ſcripture doctrine as it is, and thoſe who do not.

 provided

provided for by tithes. These, it is represented, are extremely oppressive, injurious to the public, and the greatest checks that can be to agricultural improvements. Mr. Fox is pleased to style them barbarous, but why, is not quite so easy to say; for there seems to be very little connection indeed between tithes and barbarism, unless the Right Honourable Gentleman shall think fit to tell us they are barbarous because they had their origin in the feudal times. But if he does, an unlucky question or two will require an answer. Were tithes the invention of the feudal times? Were they never heard of in the world before the feudal times? A plain and direct answer to these questions, which every man of common knowledge and reading is able to give, will determine at once how far tithes may with propriety be called barbarous. However, our business at present is not with a word, but with facts. Are tithes checks to agricultural improvements, and of course injurious to the public, or are they not?

By tithes we understand the tenth part of the produce of the land. Thus the tithes of an acre of land producing twenty bushels of wheat are two bushels.

He

He that is in poſſeſſion of an acre of tithe-able land, either by inheritance or by purchaſe, poſſeſſes it knowing that he is entitled only to nine tenths of its produce, be the produce more or leſs.

He that occupies it as tenant pays rent for it only in proportion to that part of its produce to which he is entitled.

Now then we will ſuppoſe the occupier of this acre, by manure and proper management, to be able to increaſe its produce from 20 to 30 buſhels; in that caſe the tithe will be three buſhels; he, inſtead of 18, will have 27 buſhels, but his rent will continue to be the ſame. Here then, by this improvement of his land, he is benefited a full third in its produce beyond what he pays rent for. Now how is it poſſible that in this inſtance tithes can be any check to agricultural improvement? Tithes in this inſtance, to be a check to improvement, ought to operate ſo as to leave the farmer little or no advantage at all; whereas here we ſee it leaves him benefited by a full third.

Should it be ſaid (for in theſe philoſophical days there is hardly any thing that men will

not ſay) that a third increaſe in the produce will not indemnify the farmer for his expence, except he has the tithe buſhel as well as the other nine: let it be obſerved that, except in ſome very extraordinary caſes, his expence in improving the produce of his acre from 20 to 30 buſhels cannot be any thing near the value of his increaſed profit. Let us eſtimate the wheat at 6s. a buſhel, the value of the increaſed produce to the farmer, after the tithe is deducted, will be 54s. a ſum more than double the expence of obtaining the improved produce. This every farmer knows to be true, and therefore it needs not be proved. But perhaps this kind of improvement is not what is meant when it is ſaid that tithes are a check to agricultural improvement. Let us then ſtate the caſe of barren and unproductive land: the proprietor of this land wiſhes it to be brought into a ſtate of cultivation; he determines upon accompliſhing it, he expends an hundred pounds upon it, and in the courſe of three years effects his purpoſe. But no ſooner does it become productive, than the rapacious tithingman, who had not laid out a ſixpence in the improvement,

ment, runs away with the tenth of the produce, to the very great prejudice of the proprietor.

Here, in the firſt place, let it be obſerved, that whatever injury may ariſe to the proprietor from the tithing-man, it is an injury which he knew before hand he muſt ſubject himſelf to if he improved his land, and therefore, whatever of injury there is in it, he brings it entirely upon himſelf. But this you will ſay is the very hinge on which the queſtion turns; for proprietors, who know they ſhall be injured by the tithing-man, will not, for that very reaſon, improve their lands, and therefore tithes are a check to agricultural improvements.

Let us allow that there is in this inſtance ſome ſmall degree of truth; yet how eaſily may it be obviated: the injury to the proprietor is, that he is to be at the whole expence of the improvement, and then is to be deprived of a part of its produce by the tithingman; and that part which he is deprived of may be the whole that would be gained by the improvement. Let us ſuppoſe the proprietor, in principal and intereſt, for three years lays out an hundred pounds, the improved

proved land ought to pay him annually his intereſt for that ſum, which we will rate at four and a half, with a conſiderable ſurplus, in recompence for his trouble and hazard; but the whole that it yields him perhaps is five pounds, and no more; of courſe the whole profit on the improvement is ten ſhillings only, and this the tithing-man runs away with; ſo that the proprietor lays out an hundred pounds upon his land and gains nothing in return, but his trouble and hazard for his pains. A caſe ſo diſadvantageous as this to the proprietor is not very probable indeed; but as it is poſſible, therefore it is put. Now then, in anſwer to this, let it be remembered, that tithes are eſtabliſhed by the law of the land, by the ſame law which ſecures his property to the proprietor; and that the hardſhip in the caſe is, that the tithing-man participates in no ſhare of the expence or hazard attending the improvement. The hardſhip is not that the tithing-man takes a tenth of the produce of the improved land, but that he contributes nothing towards making it productive. For this, however, ſo eaſy a remedy might be provided, that it is rather extraordinary that it never

never has been thought of: for inſtance, when a proprietor chooſes to hazard the improvement of his land, by bringing it from a barren to a ſtate of cultivation, let him be either indemnified in one tenth of the expence (the expence being firſt clearly and indiſputably aſcertained) out of the tithes as they ariſe, or (in order to guard againſt juggles or colluſion) let it be at the option of the tithing-man to pay him that tenth of the expence at once, and thenceforward be entitled to the tithes as in other caſes. Here then the hardſhip ariſing from the proprietor's being deprived of the tithe of that land which he alone, at his own expence, had made titheable, is removed. There is a ſtatute, indeed, which provides, that the proprietor ſhall have his land tithe free for ſeven years after the improvement made: but the tithe of ſeven years, in the caſe already ſtated, would not amount to one tenth of the expence, would hardly amount to it in twenty years; therefore, notwithſtanding the ſtatute, it might be urged, that tithes are an obſtruction to agricultural improvements: whereas, by the mode here recommended, the objection would be entirely done away; for if the tithing-

tithing-man pays his quota of the expence, he has as juſt a right in equity as well as law to the tithe of the produce, as the proprietor hath to the other nine parts of it.

But it will be ſaid, whether the objection be thus removed or not is quite immaterial, tithes in any manner paid or demanded are obſtructions to agricultural improvement. I am in poſſeſſion of the land, my labour and expence are employed in cauſing it to be productive; the tithing-man in general has no ſhare in either, and yet he takes from me a tenth part of what my induſtry, and not his, has cauſed the land to produce. This is a hardſhip of very great magnitude, and cannot but operate extremely to the diſadvantage of all improvements in agriculture: for who will beſtow his labour where he has a certainty that he ſhall not enjoy the fruits of it, where he is certain that another will come and plunder him of a tenth part?

This objection, it muſt be owned, is popular and plauſible, and well calculated to make an impreſſion upon weak minds; but let us aſk a queſtion or two upon the ſubject. You ſay you are in poſſeſſion of the land, by what right are you in poſſeſſion of it? Is it

by

by a natural right, or by the laws of ſociety? By the former, except you are deranged in your intellects, you will hardly ſay it is; therefore your right of poſſeſſion is derived to you from the laws of your country, which ſecure to you the poſſeſſion, and protect you in it; for if your right were not derived from the laws, your poſſeſſion would be altogether precarious; it would be only till ſome one of greater ſtrength and might than yourſelf ſhould think fit to diſpoſſeſs you. If then your right is derived to you from the laws, that right will alſo be determinable by the laws, and can be no more than the laws have given you.: what then is the right which the laws have given you? They have given you a right to hold your land as a poſſeſſion to yourſelf, and to cultivate and diſpoſe of it as you ſhall think proper. But then they have ſubjected this land, in the poſſeſſion of which you are protected, to a deduction of one tenth of its produce; therefore, the deduction of one tenth of the produce of your land is the condition annexed to your being ſecured in the poſſeſſion of it. What then have you to complain of? You labour for others, you ſay. It is true in ſome meaſure you do; but you

you labour in a much greater degree for yourſelf; and if one tenth goes from you, the other nine parts are your own. Which are moſt aſſuredly a very ample recompence for your expence and labour. But ſtill a man will ſay, why ſhould any be taken from him? why ſhould he not enjoy the whole produce of his labour? The anſwer is, becauſe the laws have ordained that he ſhould not: thoſe very laws which ſecure to him his property, and which will not ſuffer him to be deprived of it injuriouſly and without his own conſent.

Philoſophers, it is preſumed, will not refuſe to acknowledge that property ariſes either from poſſeſſion ſimply, without any other ſecurity or protection in it than what a man can ſupply from his own individual ſtrength, or it ariſes to him from poſſeſſion, ſecured and ſtrengthened by the arm of ſociety, which, acknowledging the right of poſſeſſion to be in him and in no other perſon, will not ſuffer him to be moleſted in the peaceable enjoyment of what he poſſeſſes. In the former caſe the whole produce of his labour may indeed be his own without any deduction from it; but then, without any

certainty

certainty or aſſurance that it ſhall, for when a ſtronger than himſelf comes upon him, he will not only take from him the produce of his labour, but diſpoſſeſs him likewiſe of the land from whence that produce was obtained, therefore in this caſe all is caſual and uncertain. In the other there is nothing hazardous or doubtful: the laws of ſociety ſecure to him the poſſeſſion of his land againſt all intruders, and the produce of it againſt all, except thoſe to whom they have allotted a tenth part of it. If you complain of this allotment, aſſuredly you complain moſt unjuſtly. The partiality of the laws is undeniably very great in your favour, when it ſecures to you the portion of land which you happen to be in poſſeſſion of againſt all who might have ſtrength and ability to diſpoſſeſs you of it; and the allotment of a tenth part of its produce is but a very moderate compenſation of the law's juſtice towards thoſe who have no land. Compare theſe two caſes together, and ſay, whether is preferable a precarious, unprotected, right of poſſeſſion of the land with all its produce which you can enjoy, only ſo long as no one chooſes to deprive you of it, or a protected right of poſſeſſion

wherein

wherein no one either by fraud or violence is ſuffered to moleſt you; ſubject only to a deduction of one tenth of the produce for the uſe of thoſe whom ſociety ſets as great a value upon as it does upon yourſelf. What is your right of poſſeſſion? You are entirely indebted to ſociety for it, and you have that right purely becauſe ſociety chooſes to acknowledge it. If you have any other right, ſhew us what it is. Poſſeſſion is not right: God and nature have not given you any right; for you came into the world as naked and deſtitute of poſſeſſion as you will go out of it. The right, therefore, which you have to the poſſeſſion of your land accrues to you entirely from the laws of ſociety; and in fact your poſſeſſion is a donation to you from it. If then the land is a donation to you, and ſuch it moſt certainly is, with what juſtice can you complain of tithes as injurious to you? Have you any right to the poſſeſſion of your land without paying tithes? Society hath not given it to you? On the contrary, ſociety hath given you your land's poſſeſſion, ſubject to the payment of tithes. Groundleſs therefore, as it is unjuſt, is your complaint concerning tithes. A very inge-

nious

nious writer, the author of the "Wealth of Nations," in order to throw as much odium as he can upon tithes, calls them a tax, a deſtructive tax, upon the land. He urges that the culture of madder, on account of tithes, was confined to the United Provinces, and would never have been introduced into this country had not a ſtatute, "Enacted that five ſhillings an acre ſhould be received in lieu of all manner of tithe upon madder." Here then, in the firſt place, it may be obſerved, that the culture of madder does not ſeem to be in any reſpect neceſſary to the exiſtence or welfare of this country. So that whether it was or was not cultivated in England could not be very material, and conſequently, if the law of tithes confined its cultivation to the United Provinces, no general detriment aroſe to the inhabitants of this country from it. It is true ſome advantage would be derived from its cultivation to a few dyers. But what are theſe when compared to the community in general, who muſt be ſupported by the cultivation of the corn and wood, and paſture-land, of the kingdom? However let us examine the fact alleged by Dr. Smith, that the law of tithes operated to

to the disadvantage of the culture of madder. To this end let us consider the expence and profit attending the cultivation of an acre of madder, when no tithes are paid, and the land is rented at 40s. an acre. The whole expence, it seems, for three years, is 15l. 5s. (the particulars may be seen in the fourth volume, page 175, of the *Museum Rusticum*) for which term no profit arises to the cultivator. In the autumn of the third year the roots are taken up, when the produce amounts in value to 52l. 12s. 6d. from which the expence being deducted, the clear profit will be 37l. 7s. 6d. Now then, subtracting a tenth from this sum, the cultivator will nett 33l. 12s. 9d.; so that the annual profit to the planter upon a single acre will be, notwithstanding Dr. Smith's destructive tax, no less a sum than 11l. 4s. 3d. that is almost six rents of the land! Would not one have imagined from this writer's representation, that if the full tithes were taken, the remaining profit upon an acre would not be worth the planter's attention? and yet here we see the remaining profit vastly exceeds the profit upon any other cultivation: so that the complaint against tithes, as prejudicial to the cultivation

tion of madder, is not founded on the planter's having too little, but on the tithing-man's having ſo much more than he would have if the land was planted with any other crop. In the valuation here ſtated of the crop of one acre, the tithe amounts to 3l. 14s. 9d. in three years; but if planted with any other crop, it would not yield to the tithing-man more than 15s. or 18s. and therefore, except the tithe from madder be fixed at the average value of the tithe of any other crop, I will not raiſe madder, ſaith the planter; and becauſe he will not, Dr. Smith teaches us that the law of tithes operates to the diſadvantage of the culture of madder. This, it muſt be confeſſed, is moſt curious reaſoning: it is neither more nor leſs than ſaying, becauſe a plantation of madder will be ſo much more beneficial to the tithing-man than a plantation of any other crop, therefore I will not plant it, although it will be ſo beneficial to myſelf. But how can this objection be ſaid to ariſe from tithes? It ariſes from the deſpicable temper of the objector, who, overcome by the unmanly ſpirit of envy, declines the cultivation purely from that malignant principle alone; for now that the tithes are fixed at

the low rate of five ſhillings an acre, the objection is at an end.

The reaſoning of Dr. Smith on the ſubject of tithes is extremely fallacious; and in juſtice to his character we will ſuppoſe that he was not aware of the fallacy of it himſelf. "In ſome rich lands (he ſays) the produce is ſo great, that one half of it is fully ſufficient to replace to the farmer the capital employed in cultivation, together with the ordinary profits of farming ſtock in the neighbourhood. The other half, or, what comes to the ſame thing, the value of the other half, he could afford to pay as rent to the landlord, if there was no tithe. But if the tenth of the profit is taken from him by way of tithe, he muſt require an abatement of the fifth part of his rent, otherwiſe he cannot get back his capital with the ordinary profit." But what does all this amount to? Only that the tenant, if he did not pay to the tithing-man, could afford to pay ſo much more to the landlord, which I ſuppoſe no man in his ſenſes will deny; but it is nothing at all to the purpoſe, except it had been previouſly proved that all the profits beyond the ordinary and allowed profits of the tenant ought to go

to the landlord, which cannot be proved, becauſe the law, the law by which the proprietor holds his land, directs that one tenth ſhall go to the tithing-man, and not to the landlord; and the landlord holds his land knowing it to be ſo, and the tenant rents the land knowing that the tenth part of its produce goes to the tithing-man, and not to the landlord. But again Dr. Smith ſays,

"Upon the rent of rich lands the tithe may ſometimes be a tax of no more than one fifth part, or 4s. in the pound; whereas upon that of poorer lands it may ſometimes be a tax of one half, or 10s. in the pound." But what has tithe to do with the rent of the land? The tithe, let the rent of the land be what it will, is the tenth part of its produce; and whether the rent be half a crown or fifty ſhillings an acre, is of no manner of conſequence. If the tithe were taken out of the rent of the land, the tithe might in ſome meaſure be called a *tax* upon the rent; but this in the knowledge of every one it is not; and therefore Dr. Smith greatly deceived himſelf when he called it a tax upon the rent. Can a landlord with any degree of propriety call that which he has not, and which he is

not entitled to, a tax upon his rent? But the tithes are not his; by the laws of the land they are the property of another, and he never receives them either with or as part of his rent; consequently they are not deducted from it, and therefore are no tax upon it. A tax is a deduction from something which a man has; but if what he has not may be called a tax upon him, then is it a tax upon every man that he has not his neighbour's property. The tithes are the property of another, and therefore are no tax upon the landlord; and consequently when Dr. Smith says the tithes are a tax of one fifth or one half part of the rent of the land, he miserably deceives himself; and in general all the writers against tithes proceed upon mistaken or fallacious grounds. They assume that tithes are not property till after they are separated and taken from the other nine parts, which is not true: they are the property of the tithing-man as certainly as the land is the property of the land owner; and they are such, wherever there is a crop, whether separated or not; and they at no time make any part of the property of the owner of the land; for if they did, he might have his ac-

tion

tion for the recovery of them when taken away, which he hath not; and if they were not property till after they were ſeparated from the other nine parts, the owner or occupier of the land would have nothing to do but to carry off the whole of the crop before any ſeparation was made, and he would be juſtified in it. But this we all know he may not do; therefore tithes are true and real property. But if they are, what are they doing who object to tithes? May not the tithing man have his property as well as you have yours? Objections to property in ſociety, when that property is founded in the laws of the ſociety (and in the laws alone is property of any kind founded), are indefenſible, and their tendency is to throw every thing into confuſion. For when once property is attacked in one inſtance it may be attacked in another; and if the proprietor of the tithes may be deprived of his property, by the ſame rule the proprietor of the land may be deprived of his; and then where ſhall we ſtop? and what will it all end in? It will end only in the annihilation of all property; for as tithes are conſidered as a tax upon the rent of the land, ſo will the poſſeſſion of the land be conſidered

 as

as a tax upon the community; and hence no man will have any thing, which he may call his own, any longer than while he can by his own individual ſtrength maintain the poſſeſſion of it.

But before we quit this ſubject it will be proper to obviate an objection which has been made to tithes, when it has been ſuggeſted that if they are property, they became ſo only from a very modern date: Dr. Prieſtley dates their origin from the times of King John. But in this, as in his aſſertions in general, Dr. Prieſtley is wonderfully ſuperficial.

In the reign of King John the rights and privileges, and property, of Engliſh ſubjects were more perfectly ſecured to them than they had been in former reigns, and among them the property of tithes. But tithes, or property of any other kind, did not firſt begin to be known in England in his reign. Property was known in England for ages before the time of King John, and ſecured to its owners by all the authority which the conſtitution of thoſe days was acquainted with. And *Magna Charta* is not the firſt inſtitution of the property of tithes, but a confirmation of all the ſeveral grants of them which had been made

made in former reigns. It is a miſtaken notion that tithes were firſt made *general* in the reign of King John, for the grant of tithes in general, throughout the whole kingdom, had been made long before. Of this there is the plaineſt proof from the charter of King Ethelwolf (to go no farther back), who, with the conſent of all the great men, eccleſiaſtical as well as temporal, *with the entire approbation of the Commons*, did grant to the church *decimam partem terrarum* throughout the whole kingdom. The grant was firſt made by him in 854, and again renewed the following year, when it was preſented by him in a moſt ſolemn manner upon the altar of St. Peter's Church in Wincheſter; and to make the grant as certain and notorious as poſſible, it was ſent abroad and publiſhed in every pariſh church in the kingdom. When Dr. Prieſtley, or any of his fautors, chooſe to object to tithes again, it is recommended to them to attend a little more to matters of fact. Let us diſmiſs Dr. Prieſtley then, and his objections, as too idle to merit any farther notice, and obſerve, that whoever is perſuaded of the truth of revealed religion, and is uncontaminated with the deluſions of modern philoſophy,

philoſophy, will readily accede to this propoſition—That the mode of proviſion, which Almighty God himſelf appointed for thoſe who were to miniſter at his altar, is the beſt and the moſt unexceptionable; and therefore, when ſuch perſons ſee that under the Jewiſh diſpenſation his miniſters had a grant made to them of the tithe of the land for their maintenance and ſupport, it is impoſſible for them not to be perſuaded that ſuch proviſion is founded on the depths of the trueſt wiſdom, and that it may be juſtified againſt all the exceptions which the perverted reaſon of man can at any time ſuggeſt.

It is true, that under the Chriſtian diſpenſation, the miniſters of Chriſt cannot lay claim to tithes under the ſame ſanction of divine authority as the Jews did, as they ſeem no where to be particularly enjoined by the goſpel. It is only ordained, that they who preach the goſpel ſhould live of the goſpel. But then, as they are to live of the goſpel, it muſt be by ſome certain mode of maintenance; and what other mode of maintenance can the wit of man deviſe preferably to that by which the Jewiſh miniſtry was maintained? Alms, and the charitable con-

tributions

tributions of the benevolent, are all precarious; they may at one time be exceedingly abundant, as they were when Chriſtians were combating with the powers of the heathen world, when they not only gave the tenth, but ſold the whole of their poſſeſſions, that they might be diſtributed for the benefit o. the Chriſtian church. And they may be ſparing and penurious, altogether inſufficient, for ſupplying the neceſſities of thoſe who ſtand in need of them, and ſufficient only to ſhow how impoſſible it is that a Chriſtian miniſtry ſhould be ſupported by them. This our forefathers well conſidered when the world became Chriſtian, and therefore, conforming themſelves to the example which was given them under the Jewiſh diſpenſation, they ordained, that tithes ſhould be a proviſion for the Chriſtian clergy, and that they ſhould be ſecured to them by the ſame laws as ſecure the property of any other individuals. And this they did, that the Chriſtian clergy might neither conſider themſelves, nor be conſidered by others, as a burthen upon community, but as a part of it, and as having the ſame call and right to an independent and certain proviſion as any

others of the community had. Say philoſophers; why the laws ſhould give and ſecure to you, who have no religion, a certain and independent proviſion, and withhold it from thoſe who are the miniſters of religion. Are not the miniſters of religion men as well as yourſelves? Have they not the ſame natural rights as you have? Have they not the ſame natural wants and neceſſities? Why then are they to be pinched with hunger and poverty, while you feed and have abundance? Or why are they to be made dependent for a precarious ſubſiſtence upon the good will of thoſe who, perhaps, like yourſelves, may have nothing but evil will towards them? Is there any thing in nature or reaſon, or in equity, that will juſtify this? Moſt aſſuredly there is not, and therefore the outcry of thoſe who exclaim againſt eſtabliſhments, and againſt any permanent proviſion for the Chriſtian miniſtry, is altogether unnatural, unreaſonable, and moſt unjuſt. But you ſay you do not exclaim againſt a permanent proviſion being made for the clergy, but againſt the mode by which it is made by tithes; theſe you ſay are offenſive and odious. But why are they ſo? becauſe you are greedy and co-

vetous;

vetous; becauſe you are not contented with the nine parts which are your own, or for which you pay rent, except you can have the other tenth part which is not your own, and for which you pay no rent. However, not to enter into any farther argument upon the ſubject of tithes, if you diſlike them, deviſe, if you can, ſome other mode of proviſion for the clergy without them, which ſhall be equally certain and permanent, equally valuable and advantageous, and which ſhall no more entangle them with ſecular affairs than tithes do; and when you have or can do any thing of this kind, the clergy, doubtleſs, will have no objection to it. But, until you have or can do it, the leſs you ſay in objection to tithes the better, for your objections will prove to be as idle and unfounded as is your philoſophy which is the parent of them.

And, indeed, the philoſophy of the preſent age is the idleſt and moſt ridiculous introduction of folly into the world that is conceivable. Various inſtances might be given in addition to thoſe which have been already mentioned of the truth of this; but we will content ourſelves with the mention of one

more

more only, and that ſhall be Pain's and his philoſophical brethren's notion of a conſtitution, and of the origin of the Engliſh Parliament.

A conſtitution, it is imagined, may be truly deſcribed to be that particular combination of the legiſlative and executive powers in a country from whence are derived the form and operations of its government; and in proportion as the combination of theſe powers is either well or ill adjuſted, ſo likewiſe will the goverment of that country be either good or bad: therefore, wherever there is an exiſting government, there by neceſſity muſt be a conſtitution of which it is the offspring.

But now let us hear our philoſophers, who, with a wiſdom peculiar to themſelves, have diſcovered that there may be an exiſting government in a country without any conſtitution at all. Pain repeatedly tells his reader that in England there is none; that the badneſs, the corruptneſs of its government is a proof that there is none. He calls upon Mr. Burke to produce the Engliſh conſtitution; and, taking it for granted that he cannot, ſays, "We may fairly conclude, that though it has been ſo much talked of,

no

no ſuch thing as a conſtitution exiſts, or ever did exiſt." What ſhall we ſay to ſuch a reaſoner as this? If there is a government in England, it muſt be derived from the legiſlative and executive powers, for without them no government could exiſt any where; and from whatever the government is derived, that is the conſtitution. But ſurely it is unneceſſary to prove that the legiſlative and executive are the powers by which a government is conſtituted, ſince it is impoſſible that government can be exerciſed without them: if it can, ſhew us how; ſhew how government can be exerciſed, detached from and unconnected with the legiſlative and executive powers. But if government is conſtituted by theſe powers, then theſe powers, let them reſide where they will, are the conſtitution. It is moſt wretched trifling and folly to argue as theſe people do, that becauſe a government is corrupt, therefore there is no conſtitution. They might as well argue that, becauſe a man is a valetudinarian, and unhealthy, therefore he has no conſtitution. Is there not a variety of conſtitutions of the natural body, by which its life and well or ill being is regulated, and from whence

it proceeds? Are not ſome conſtitutionally ſtrong and athletic, and others tender, delicate, and infirm? And will you ſay, becauſe they are infirm, they have no conſtitution? You may as well ſay this as argue that the corruptneſs of the government in a country is the certain ſign that it hath no conſtitution. The political life of a country, which is its government, in its well or ill being depends entirely on its conſtitution, upon the peculiar temperament, idioſynchraſy, of it; and whatever that peculiar temperament may be, by that will the government neceſſarily be affected. If that is firm and ſtrong, ſo will the government be; if it is otherwiſe and defective, the government which flows from it will be defective likewiſe.

But Pain ſays, "The continual uſe of the word conſtitution in the Engliſh parliament ſhews there is none; and that the whole is merely a form of government without a conſtitution, and conſtituting itſelf with what powers it pleaſes." Here again we have an inſtance of the ſtrange paradoxical operations of modern philoſophy upon the minds of its votaries. How can a form of government exiſt without being formed and conſtituted? Here

Here alſo we ſee how poſſible it is for a man to write as if he had ideas, and yet in reality to have none at all. "The continual uſe," he ſays, "of the word conſtitution in the Engliſh parliament, ſhews that there is none; and that the whole is merely a form of government," &c. The whole what? Is it the whole form of government? The whole conſtitution? or the whole parliament? Or does he mean the whole uſe of the word conſtitution is merely a form of government? Is it poſſible for a man to frame to himſelf any conſiſtent idea from theſe words of Pain? Doubtleſs he muſt think he has ſome himſelf; but as he has not thought fit to communicate them to his reader, we muſt leave him to the ſolaces of his own imagination. In the mean time, let us attend to ſomething which perhaps may be thought more ſubſtantial than the whole of Pain's publication.

Wherever there is a form of government, there of neceſſity muſt be legiſlative and executive powers, from whence that form proceeds, and by which it is maintained, and this we ſay is the conſtitution; and this conſtitution (merely in compliance with popular opinion, for it is deſtitute of proof) we will

farther ſay, had its origin in the firſt combination of a people into ſociety, when by a ſocial compact legiſlative and executive powers were agreed upon, and a form of government in all its various departments was founded and eſtabliſhed upon theſe powers. Theſe ſocieties upon earth being various, various alſo would be their ſocial compacts, and various the conſtitutions and forms of government. What one ſociety would approve and adopt, another would reject as totally inconſiſtent with its well being or continuance. Hence ſome forms of government would naturally be better and more perfect than others; for in a variety of different forms it is not to be ſuppoſed that all would be equally perfect: but then, notwithſtanding this comparative imperfection in ſome of them, there would nevertheleſs be a conſtitution, the parent of each of them, even of the moſt imperfect; for whereever there is an exiſting government there muſt be a conſtitution, which cannot ceaſe till all is anarchy and confuſion; where there are governors and governed, there muſt be legiſlative and executive powers, and where they are there is a conſtitution.

It

It makes nothing againſt what is here ſaid to urge that the legiſlative and executive powers were the conſequence of an original ſocial compact, when men firſt formed themſelves into ſociety; for although according to the hypotheſis it is true, it by no means follows that the conſequence of the ſocial compact is not the conſtitution, but juſt the contrary, that it is, and thus much Pain acknowledges, if he means by his own words what they appear to ſignify; for, p. 56, where he undertakes to define what a conſtitution is, he ſays, "The conſtitution of a country is not the act of its government, but of the people conſtituting a government." Now the word *act* ſignifies ſomething that is done; and the act of a people conſtituting a government is that which is done by the people upon ſuch occaſion; and that which is done by them is the reſult, the conſequence of their ſocial agreement or compact, and the reſult of their ſocial agreement being the eſtabliſhment of legiſlative and executive powers; therefore, the reſult of the ſocial compact in the eſtabliſhment of legiſlative and executive powers is the conſtitution, and from theſe powers is derived government in all its various departments. But it is to be

feared Pain does not mean any thing of this kind by what he ſays; and perhaps it will be no eaſy matter to determine what he does mean. In one view of his publication we are led to conclude that he thinks the aſſembly of the people is the conſtitution; for he ſays the French conſtitution puts the legiſlative before the executive; by which he muſt mean, if he means any thing, that the national aſſembly is the conſtitution. But then again, in another place, he ſays, "The preſent national aſſembly of France is, ſtrictly ſpeaking, the perſonal ſocial compact." That is, the perſons aſſembling together for the purpoſe of compacting are the compact. Is the Conſtitutional Society enlightened with the ſame philoſophical derangement of illumination as Pain? Do they alſo think the agent to be the act, the conſtituent to be the conſtitution, and the compacting parties to be the compact? If they do, we muſt not attempt to reaſon with perſons who are thus illuminated.

Very certain it is that, antecedent to a conſtitution, there muſt be ſomething which conſtitutes; and, in conformity with popular opinions, we will admit it to be an aſſembly of

of the people, either perſonally aſſembled or by their repreſentatives: theſe, by their concurring ſuffrages, eſtabliſh legiſlative and executive powers to be a conſtitution for a government which is to be regulated and modified by them; therefore a conſtitution is derived from the concurring ſuffrages of a people aſſembled together; and becauſe this is, or is ſuppoſed to be, the caſe, therefore our conſtitutional philoſophers chooſe to be of opinion, that where the people have not been recently aſſembled together for the purpoſe of framing a conſtitution, there no conſtitution exiſts: upon no other principle can the conduct of the French be accounted for; neither upon any other principle can we conceive an apology for the proceedings of our clubs here in England. To be ſure they muſt imagine that no conſtitution can exiſt any where, except it were of yeſterday's formation; and, in imitation of the French, that no conſtitution can be framed till the people are firſt reduced to a ſtate of ſavage ferocity and barbariſm. Admit we will freely that no conſtitution exiſts where no conſtitution has been formed; but if no conſtitution exiſts except it be of yeſterday's formation, then

will there be no conſtitution any where in the world, excepting Holland and America; for what has happened in Poland certainly is not the firſt formation of a conſtitution; and what is projecting in France at this preſent moment is nothing but a wild chaotic jumble of real and imaginary elements, the deſtruction of a conſtitution rather than the formation of one; and what the end will be, it is impoſſible to foreſee.

A conſtitution, politically conſidered, neceſſarily ſuppoſes a government, and an exiſting government as neceſſarily preſuppoſes a conſtitution of which it is the offspring; therefore, wherever there is an exiſting government, there by neceſſity muſt be a conſtitution; whether good or bad, is not the queſtion: if good, it needs no amendment; if bad, either through ſome defect in its firſt formation, or through any deviation from its origin, it may undoubtedly, and indeed it ought to be amended. But he that argues that a conſtitution which wants amendment is no conſtitution at all, however he may pride himſelf in being a philoſopher, has no reaſon to boaſt of his wiſdom.

But Pain urges that the Engliſh govern-

ment aroſe out of a conqueſt, and therefore that we have no conſtitution. His words are, "The Engliſh government is one of thoſe which aroſe out of conqueſt, and not out of ſociety, and conſequently it aroſe over the people; and though it has been much modified from the opportunity of circumſtances ſince the time of William the Conqueror, this country never yet has regenerated itſelf, and is therefore without a conſtitution." The anſwer to this is, that the Engliſh government did not ariſe out of a conqueſt, becauſe there was a government regular and formed (as needs not be proved) long prior to the coming over of the Duke of Normandy; that William the Firſt did not become a king of England by conqueſt, but by right, as the appointed ſucceſſor of King Edward; that king Edward had notified to him that he was to be his ſucceſſor, as *Ordericus Vitalis* informs us, *Primo per Robertum Cant. Summum Pontificem, poſtea per eundem Haruldum, integram Anglici regni Mandaverat conceſſionem ipſumque* CONCEDENTIBUS ANGLIS, *fecerat totius juris ſui hæredem.* And upon the principle of his having a legal title, William juſtified his claim to the crown in the anſwer which

he returned to Harold, who demanded of him on what ground he invaded England; and the ſame language he uſed conſtantly after he was in poſſeſſion of the crown, never grounding his title to the kingdom on conqueſt, but always on his inheritance of conſanguinity, and on his being the adopted heir of the kingdom; and when at any time he is called conqueror, it never is by reaſon of his having conquered the people of England, but on account of his having conquered the uſurper Harold. A conqueſt of the people of England was wholly unneceſſary, as they made no oppoſition to him, and indeed themſelves had invited him to come and take poſſeſſion of the crown, which Harold had uſurped: and William the Firſt was no more a conqueror of the people of England than William the Third was; both were invited over by the people, both governed by the voluntary ſubmiſſion of the people, and according to the eſtabliſhed laws of the realm, which were ſolemnly ratified in the inſtance of the Norman William in the fourth year of his reign. Therefore Pain and his comrades appear to be as completely ignorant of the origin of the Engliſh government, as they are of what is or is not a conſtitution.

a conſtitution. Not better informed is Pain, when he tells his reader, p. 84, that "The parliament in England, in both its branches, was erected by patents from the deſcendants of the Conqueror." But if this was the caſe, then was England an entire ſtranger to parliaments till long after the reign of William the Firſt, which he muſt be ignorant indeed who does not know to be altogether falſe. Long before the reign of the deſcendants of William, and long before the reign of even William himſelf, were parliaments known in England; not indeed with the formalities of the preſent day, but with the ſame eſſential properties of parliament, as might be evidenced in a great variety of inſtances, were there any occaſion in a matter of ſuch general notoriety: therefore let one only inſtance ſuffice; it is curious, but little known, and well authenticated, of a parliament holden at Shifford, in the county of Oxford, in the days of Alfred the Great. The account of it is given in a manuſcript in Sir Robert Cotten's library, in the following terms:

Aꞇ Siꝼꝼoꞃꝺ ꞅeꞇen Ðaneꞃ manie, ꝼele Biꞅ-copꞅ, eꞇ ꝼele Bocleꞃeꝺ Eꞃleꞅ pꞃuꝺe, eꞇ Cnihꞇeꞅ eᵹloche. ðeꞃ paꞅ Eꞃle Elꝼꞃic oꝼ ðe laᵹe

ꞅmuꞇh

ſmuth pire, ⁊ ec Alfred Englehird, Engle derling, on England he paſ Cyng, hem he gan leren, ſpo hi heren mihten hu hi here lif leden ſcolden.

In Engliſh thus: *There ſat at Shifford many Thanes, many Biſhops, and many learned men, wiſe Earls, and awful Knights. There was Earl Elfrick, very learned in the law, and Alfred, England's herdſman, England's darling; he was king of England; he taught them that could hear him how they ſhould live.*

The manuſcript as referred to by Dr. Plot in his Hiſtory of Oxfordſhire, ed. 1677, fol. 22; and the tranſlation is given in Dr. Plot's own words.

Here then was a parliament holden almoſt 200 years before what is called the conqueſt, conſiſting of all the various orders of the kingdom, aſſembled together with their king; and therefore Pain affirms what is not true, when he tells his reader that the Engliſh parliament was *erected* by patents from the deſcendants of the Conqueror. Whether the manuſcript above ſpecified is ſtill in being, I know not. If by any good fortune it ſhould have been one of thoſe which eſcaped when ſo many others periſhed, it may ſtill be ſeen in the Britiſh Muſeum.

In confirmation of the truth of the above manuſcript, the reader is to be informed, that the remembrance of this parliament is ſtill preſerved at Shifford by a name being given to the ſpot whereon it was holden, which from that event is to this day called the *Court Cloſe*. There is moreover one of the common fields in the neighbourhood of Shifford which, from the ſome event, is called the *Kinſea* or *Kinſey Field.*

Before the days of Alfred the aſſemblies of the people uſed to be tumultuous, and without any order or regularity; but this wiſe prince taught thoſe who could hear him how they ought to live; that they ought to regulate themſelves by wiſdom, and ſome certain and ſtandard rule; that in their aſſemblies their chief object ought to be the public good, and that men of all orders ought to contribute their endeavours towards it; and for this purpoſe he convened all the various orders in his kingdom, Thanes, Earls, Knights, &c. to meet him at Shifford. From this venerable then, but at preſent forſaken ſpot, iſſued the firſt dawnings of the Engliſh government (in a meeting of the king with his people in their ſeveral ranks and orders), which

which from that time went on meliorating and receiving improvements through various ſucceſſions of ages, till it received its final completion and eſtabliſhment at the revolution.

It may be difficult perhaps to aſcertain the preciſe year in which this parliament was holden, ſomewhere, moſt probably, between the years 872 and 880. Univerſity College, in Oxford, I believe dates its foundation from the year 872, and of courſe it may be ſuppoſed that the parliament at Shifford, which place is in the neighbourhood of Oxford, was nearly about the ſame time. Of this, however, we have no certainty; nor indeed is it at all material whether we have or not; certain we are of the manuſcript, and certain likewiſe that places at or near Shifford are, and have been from time immemorial denominated, as hath been already mentioned, and evidently from the event of Alfred's parliament. The Court Cloſe muſt indiſputably have been ſo denominated from ſome court having been holden there at ſome period; but at no period have we any account of a court at Shifford other than what this manuſcript gives us an account of in the days of

of Alfred; and it is material to obſerve, that the conſtant tradition of the country has been, that the Court Cloſe was ſo called becauſe *the firſt court that ever was held in England was held there.* Therefore at Shifford is the venerable ſpot from whence originated our liberties, our parliaments, and every thing that is moſt dear to us in our invaluable conſtitution. The ancient church at Shifford whilſt it remained ſtanding bore ſtrong marks of a very remote antiquity; it was ſituated within what is called the Court Cloſe, and it is no unreaſonable conjecture to ſuppoſe that it was firſt erected in conſequence of, and in commemoration of this venerable aſſembly. A few years ſince, by the neglect of the pariſhioners (a neglect not uncommon in almoſt all pariſhes), a part of it fell, and by their ſtill further neglect, it became ſo entirely ruinous, that it admitted not of being repaired; ſo that this reſpectable monument of antiquity, and of the religion of our forefathers, was taken down, and a new ſtructure has been erected in its room. Tradition ſays, and I think it is taken notice of by Dr. Plot, that Shifford was heretofore a place of ſo much conſequence, that it had no fewer than

than ſeventeen pariſh churches belonging to it, but at preſent there remains ſcarcely the ſmalleſt veſtige of any of them; ſuch ſtrange effects are brought about by the revolution of ages. Strange indeed! Tyre, which was once the queen of nations, is now become a forſaken rock, reſorted to only by a few ſolitary fiſhermen. And Shifford, which in the annals of this kingdom ſhould have had the chiefeſt place, is now ſuch a deſerted depopulated ſpot, that ſcarcely any man paſſeth that way. The night Raven and the Bittern, and birds of ſolitude, chiefly take up their melancholy abode there; and the place where Alfred firſt laid the foundation of the Engliſh government, is ſcarcely ever paſſed over but by the reſident farmer and his family, or by the inhabitants of the neighbouring villages, when the countryman plods his way to the church at the exile ſound of two ſmall bells; he paſſeth over it with a careleſs ſtep, nothing troubling himſelf about the tranſactions of former ages; but were it poſſible for ſuch an one to feel by the recollection of ages by-gone, how muſt his boſom be warmed by the fire of patriotiſm, as often as he traceth over with his footſteps the place where

Alfred firſt laid the foundation of his and his country's happineſs. That man (ſays the ſage Johnſon) is little to be envied, whoſe patriotiſm would not gain force upon the plains of *Marathon*, or whoſe piety would not grow warmer among the ruins of *Iona*. And frigid indeed muſt be the indifference of that Engliſhman, who, enjoying the full effects and bleſſings of the beſt conſtitution in the world, could treat with ſlight or neglect the remembrance of the perſon from whom, or the ſpot on which, they firſt originated. The age, in general, has of late been fond of erecting monuments, and of commemorating events of very little real conſequence; but here is an opportunity of commemorating an event in which the ages, yet unborn, will be intereſted, an event which diſſipates like ſmoke before the wind the ſuggeſtions of revolution and conſtitutional clubs, and of thoſe philoſophical fanatics who tell us that the parliament in England, in both its branches, was erected by patents from the deſcendants of the conqueror. Parliaments have been known in England ever ſince the Engliſh have been combined into one people. Firſt begun, doubtleſs, when that event firſt hap-

pened

pened under Ethelwolf, but evidently convened and acting as a parliament by legiſlation under their great and good king Alfred. Let us hear no more, therefore, of thoſe ſlanders which are caſt upon the parliament of England, as if it was the tool, the ſervile dependant upon the will of a conqueror; as if it had no exiſtence but what was given it as a boon by the deſcendants of a Norman king. But as we are advocates for the rights and privileges of our kings, ſo let us be jealous for the honour of our parliaments, whoſe antiquity is dated from, and hath kept pace with, the conſtitution, with thoſe legiſlative and executive powers, which are ſo admirably blended in the king, the lords ſpiritual and temporal, and the repreſentatives of the common people, from which happy temperament flow all the bleſſings of the Engliſh government.

The conſtitution of England began with what is its conſtitution at the preſent day, with the legiſlative and executive powers, veſted in the king, the lords ſpiritual and temporal, and repreſentatives of the people. The parliament of England is coeval with the conſtitution; and if it had not all its rights

and privileges defined and aſcertained in its firſt origin with the ſame degree of accuracy as they have been ſince, this is no proof that parliaments did not exiſt till they were ſo defined and aſcertained, but the contrary, ſince the aſcertaining the rights and privileges of parliaments in latter times is demonſtration of their having exiſted before. This therefore is ſufficient to ſhew the extreme futility and falſehood of Pain's aſſertion, when he ſays, that the parliament in England was erected in both its branches by patents from the deſcendants of the conqueror.

From the days of Alfred certainly parliaments have been known in England; from the days of Alfred the conſtitution of England hath continued to this preſent day; and it is now become the unrivalled glory of Engliſhmen, and the admiration and envy of the whole world. If it hath any defects, it were to be wiſhed it had them not. If any thing can be added to its excellence, any thing that can promote its ſtability and permanence, by all means let it be effected: but while we attempt to add, let us take care that we do not in a much greater degree detract from its excellence; and while we attempt to

ſtrengthen, let us take heed that we do not weaken, or perhaps totally deſtroy, the foundations. In the moſt beautiful paintings of the beſt and moſt admired maſters of antiquity, an accurate obſerver ſtill perceives ſome defects which he could wiſh were not there: but where, among the moſt excellent of modern artiſts, could one be found bold enough to attempt the removal of them? Fear, in proportion to his own excellence, would reſtrain his hand from the attempt, and he would be content to conſider their defects merely as foils calculated to increaſe his admiration of their ſuperior beauties. It is thus all good and wiſe men think and act with regard to the Engliſh conſtitution. They pretend not that it hath no defect or imperfection: it is human; and therefore it hath the common lot of every thing that is human. But, framed as it hath been by the venerable hand of ages, it would require a hand that is more than human to remove its imperfection. The removal of its imperfection would be to render it perfect, but ſuch no human work can be: therefore, let us reſt contented with it as it is, in the enjoyment of that liberty and thoſe bleſſings which

it affords in ſuch abundance, and which renders the happineſs of Engliſhmen ſo much ſuperior to what the other nations of the world enjoy: bleſſings founded on and derived to us from the wiſdom of ages, and which we may with aſſurance ſay, the innovating ſpirit of modern philoſophy can never improve, for modern philoſophy is not wiſdom.

FINIS.

This day is publiſhed, Price 2s. 6d.
The Third Edition of
The LIFE of THOMAS PAIN, the Author of the *Rights of Man*.
With a Defence of his Writings,
By FRANCIS OLDYS, A. M. of the Univerſity of Penſylvania.
London: printed for JOHN STOCKDALE.

A Collection of TREATIES,
Collated with the Originals in the Paper Office.
This Day is publiſhed,
Neatly printed in two large Volumes Octavo, Price 15s. in Boards, or fine Paper 18s.
A COLLECTION OF TREATIES
Between GREAT BRITAIN and other Powers.
By GEORGE CHALMERS, Eſq.
Printed for JOHN STOCKDALE.

BOOKS *printed for* JOHN STOCKDALE.

This Day is published,
In one Volume 8vo. Price 3s. 6d. in Boards,
An ESTIMATE of the Comparative STRENGTH of GREAT-BRITAIN
During the present and four preceding Reigns,
And of the Losses of her Trade from every War since the Revolution.
By GEORGE CHALMERS, Esq.
Printed for JOHN STOCKDALE.

This day is published, Price 9s. bound,
The LONDON CALENDAR for 1792, including the Companion, the Bengal Calendar, Almanack, Arms of the Peers, &c.
The London Calendar separate, 2s. or with an Almanack, 2s. 10d.
Printed for JOHN STOCKDALE.

This Day is published,
In one large Volume 8vo. consisting of 800 Pages,
Price 18s. half-bound and lettered,
The HISTORY and PROCEEDINGS of the LORDS and COMMONS during the first Session of the Seventeenth Parliament of Great-Britain.
Printed for JOHN STOCKDALE.

This Day is published,
In one Volume 4to. illustrated with 42 Copper Plates,
Price 1l. 1s. or coloured 2l. 2s.
A Collection of PLANS of the CAPITAL CITIES in EUROPE, and some remarkable Cities in Asia, Africa, and America, with a Description of their most remarkable Buildings, Trade, Situation, Extent, &c. &c.
Selected from the best Authorities by Mr. JOHN ANDREWS.
Printed for JOHN STOCKDALE.

BOOKS *printed for* JOHN STOCKDALE.

This Day is published,

Elegantly printed in one large Volume 8vo. upon a superfine Paper, Price 10s. 6d. in Boards,

The ORIGIN of ARIANISM DISCLOSED.

By the Rev. JOHN WHITAKER, B. D.

The Author of the History of Manchester, and of the Vindication of Mary Queen of Scots.

Printed for JOHN STOCKDALE.

This Day is published,

In one large Volume Quarto, beautifully printed upon a superfine wove Royal Paper, and embellished with twelve large Maps, Charts, &c. engraved by *Medland*, *Wilson*, and *Harrison*, Price 1l. 1s. in Boards,

DISCOVERIES of the FRENCH on the SOUTH-EAST of NEW GUINEA.

To which is prefixed,

An historical Abridgment of the VOYAGES and DISCOVERIES of the SPANIARDS in the same SEAS.

By M. FLEURIEU, late Minister of the French Navy.

Translated from his corrected Copy.

*** Gentlemen desirous of having good Impressions will please to send their Orders to the Publisher, or to their respective Booksellers.

Printed for JOHN STOCKDALE.

This Day is published,

In three Volumes Quarto, Price 3l. 3s. in Boards, Illustrated with Maps, and a Portrait of the Author, engraved by J. Beugo from a Painting by Sir Joshua Reynolds,

The HISTORY of the PROGRESS and TERMINATION of the ROMAN REPUBLIC.

By ADAM FERGUSON, LL.D.

Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh.

Printed for JOHN STOCKDALE.

BOOKS *printed for* JOHN STOCKDALE.

*** Mr. STOCKDALE respectfully informs the Public, that he has purchased the few remaining Copies of the foregoing Work from Dr. Ferguson.—This Book takes up the Roman History from the earliest Period, and closes where Mr. Gibbon's Work commences; so that the two Works form a complete History of the Roman Empire.

††† Gentlemen desirous of completing their Roman History will please to apply to Mr. STOCKDALE, or to their respective Booksellers, as there are but a few Copies left.

Piccadilly, Dec. 12, 1791.

Dr. ARNOLD and Mr. CALLCOTT's New Church MUSIC,
Consisting of near 200 Tunes.

This Day is published,

In one Volume Folio, containing 250 Pages,
With an elegant Frontispiece and Vignette, designed by Stodhart, and engraved by Medland and Wilson,
Price 1l. 6s.

THE PSALMS OF DAVID,

For the Use of PARISH CHURCHES.

The Words selected by
The Rev. Sir ADAM GORDON, Bart. M. A.

The Music selected, adapted, and composed, by
Dr. ARNOLD,
Organist and Composer to his Majesty,
Assisted by
J. W. CALLCOTT, M. B.
Organist of St. Paul, Covent-Garden.

The above Work consists of Eighty Old Tunes, in two Parts; Seventy-four New Tunes, composed on Purpose, in three and four Parts, by Dr. Arnold and Mr. Callcott; and Forty-three ditto, compiled from Handel, Jomelli, Steffani, Graun, Pleydell, Arne, Boyce, Hasse, Pergolesi, &c. in three and four Parts, making one of the most elegant and complete Collections of Church Music ever published in this Kingdom.

BOOKS *printed for* JOHN STOCKDALE.

Printed for JOHN STOCKDALE, Bookseller, Piccadilly, and GEORGE GOULDING, Music-Seller, James-Street, Covent-Garden; and may be had of every Music and Bookseller in Great Britain and Ireland.

*** A SELECTION of the PSALMS, with an Introductory Preface by the Rev. Sir ADAM GORDON, may be had separate, Price 1s. 6d.

THE ROMAN HISTORY COMPLETE.

Speedily will be published,
In one large Volume, Royal Octavo,
The HISTORY and ORIGIN of ROME,
And of the ROMAN EMPIRE,
From its Rise to its Fall, both in the West and in the East.

Printed for JOHN STOCKDALE.

This Day is published,
In one Volume 8vo. Price 6s. in Boards,
PETRARCH's VIEW of HUMAN LIFE.
By Mrs. DOBSON,
Author of the Life of Petrarch.

Printed for JOHN STOCKDALE.

This Day is published,
In two Volumes, Royal Octavo, Price 1l. 11s. 6d.
in Boards,
SHAKSPEARE's WORKS, with *Ayscough's Index.*

Printed for JOHN STOCKDALE.

This Day is published,
In two Volumes 8vo. embellished with 17 Plates, designed by Stodart, and engraved by Medland,
Price One Guinea bound,
A splendid Edition of ROBINSON CRUSOE.
To which is added, The Life of *Daniel De Foe.*
By GEORGE CHALMERS, Esq.

Printed for JOHN STOCKDALE.

BOOKS *printed for* JOHN STOCKDALE;

Octavo Edition of
Governor PHILLIP's VOYAGE to BOTANY BAY,
Inscribed, by permission, to the Marquis of Salisbury.

This Day is published, Price 10s. 6d. in Boards,
In one large Volume, Royal Octavo, printed on fine Paper, and embellished with Twenty fine Copper-Plates;
The Maps and Charts taken from actual Surveys, and the Plants and Views drawn on the Spot, by Capt. Hunter, Lieut. Shortland, Lieut. Watts, Lieut. Cawes, Lieut. Bradley, Capt. Marshall, &c. and engraved by Medland, Mazell, Harrison, &c.

The VOYAGE of
Governor PHILLIP to BOTANY BAY;
With an Account of
The Establishment of the Colonies at *Port Jackson* and *Norfolk Island:*
Compiled from authentic Papers which have been received from the several Departments.

To which are added,
The JOURNALS of Lieut. *Shortland* of the Alexander, Lieut. *Watts* of the Penrhyn, Lieut. *Ball* of the Supply, and Capt. *Marshall* of the Discovery,
With an Account of their NEW DICOVERIES;
Also, an alphabetical List of the Convicts sent to Botany Bay.

The following is a List of the Plates in the Octavo Edition.

1. Frontispiece, Head of Gov. Phillip.
2. Title Page, with a beautiful Vignette.
3. View of Botany Bay.
4. View in Port Jackson.
5. Natives of Botany Bay.
6. Map of Norfolk Island.
7. Lieut. King.
8. View of a Hut in New South Wales.
9. View in New South Wales.
10. Sketch of Sydney Cove.
11. Kangaroo.
12. Spotted Opossum.
13. Vulpine Opussum.
14. Black Flying Opussum.
15. Great Brown King's Fisher.
16. Bronze-winged Pigeon.
17. New Holland Cassowary.
18. Lieut. Shortland.
19. Canoe and Natives in Mulgrave's Range.
20. Lieut. Watts.

N. B. A few Copies of the first Impression of the Quarto Edition, with Fifty-five fine Copper-Plates, and the Natural History beautifully coloured, may be had of Mr. Stockdale, Price 2l. 12s. 6d. in Boards, or the second Edition, uncoloured, 1l. 11s. 6d.

Printed for JOHN STOCKDALE, Piccadilly,
And sold by all the Booksellers in Great-Britain.